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PREFACE

This project is the culmination of my efforts to understand Hindu-Muslim relations in the
twentieth century. My thesis revolves around a paradox surrounding the Kanpur Riots, the major
finding of my research last year. After reading about the “carnage at Kanpur” in The
Construction of Communalism in North India in the February of last year, I was inspired to learn
more about the 1931 Kanpur riots.1 My efforts to find a secondary source recounting the riots,
however, were fruitless. While surveys of modern India mentioned the violence at Kanpur, no
single monograph detailing the riots existed. Instead, scholars wrote about the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report, a Congress Party authored Report that recounted the riots and included a
293-page history describing Hindu-Muslim relations.
My research at the National Archives of India (NAI) and the Nehru Memorial Museum
and Library (NMML) in New Delhi from August 3-September 3, 2007 fine-tuned this paradox.
The newspapers I consulted at NMML, The Leader and The Statesman, focused on the atrocities
committed and the ineffectiveness of police forces to quell the riots. Similarly, the testimonies of
British officials involved in the riots that I examined in the National Archives evidenced how
official (British) inaction was the notable feature of the Kanpur Riots. Yet, secondary sources
that included brief references to the Kanpur Riots attributed its significance not to official
inaction or the brutality of the violence but the literary consequences of the riots, the Kanpur
Riot Commission Report. This thesis will explore the Report and the context in which it was
written.
Because only two competing narratives of the 1931 Kanpur riots exist, the British
Commission Report and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the essential challenge of my
1
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work has been to substantiate claims about the 1931 Kanpur Riots using limited primary sources.
I have sought, wherever it was possible, to corroborate claims made in British testimonies and in
the periodicals, The Leader and The Statesman, with evidence presented in other primary
documents. In short, my efforts have been to put the nationalist version of events in dialogue
with the official (British) account.
While the aforementioned primary documents are the basis of the second and third
chapters, they do not comprise the totality of my research. The final body of sources I examined
were nationalist histories written between the 1930s until today. These histories are termed
nationalist because they were written in opposition to colonial histories, authored by British
historians and carrying an imperialistic ideological bias. Nationalist histories are a reaction to
this type of history and focus on depicting Indians as part of groups that would naturally be
identified as Indian.2 These histories provide a framework for how nationalists viewed their past
and of special note is their treatment of communalism, one of the most highly charged words of
Indian histories. “Communalism” was a term coined by the British to exclusively describe
religious relations in India. Because a plethora of books deal with communalism, I have
depended on the guidance of my thesis advisor to direct me to the most notable tracts on the
subject. His help has been invaluable. Together, the sources I have compiled provide insight into
the daily events of the Kanpur riots while placing the riot into a wider framework of how
nationalists remember and write about sectarian strife.
I have engaged in this project for a year and a half and in coming to its conclusion, I
would like to express my gratitude for all the help I received. A travel grant from the Center for
the Advanced Study of India allowed me to spend one month in India while additional funds
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from the Benjamin Franklin Scholars Program, the Penn Humanities Forum, the College Alumni
Society Board of Managers and Presidents, and the History Department defrayed research
expenses. I am additionally grateful to a number of people, all of whom I wish to acknowledge
here. I want to thank Dr. David Nelson, the South Asia bibliographer for helping me track down
a variety of sources and always being available to answer last minute queries. Daniel Crowley
deserves my thanks for editing the draft version of this thesis as do my fellow thesis writers who
inspired me with their own works and passion for history. I want to express my gratitude to Dr.
Kristen Stromberg for providing endless support during the last year and a half. Finally, I wish to
thank my thesis advisor, Dr. Ramnarayan Rawat, for pushing me to test my limits as a historian
and becoming my mentor in the process.
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INTRODUCTION

“And what havoc have we done! Women insulted! Children done to death! Let no
Hindu comfort himself with the thought that they were Musalman [Muslim]
children: let no Musalman feel happy in the knowledge that it is Hindu children
who have been killed. I do not know their religion. Let it be recognized that both
Hindus and Musalmans had lost their senses. They were all children of the soil,
children of the common Motherland.”3
Mahatma Gandhi, Young India, April 2, 1931
The Birth of a Report
The Kanpur Riots resulted in the deaths of over 400 people and left a city devastated. In
six days, from March 24th to March 30th 1931, eighteen mosques were burnt, forty-two temples
plundered and over 250 houses damaged.4 Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, the President of the United
Provinces Provincial Congress Committee, died attempting to protect Hindus from a Muslim
mob, and in every mohalla (neighborhood) of the city, stories emerged of the brutal atrocities
that had taken place. The aftermath of the riot saw the Governor in Council of the province
dismiss District Magistrate, J.F Sale, the highest British civil servant in Kanpur, and charges of
official (British) inaction during the riots coupled with the mismanagement of police forces
became front-page news. The riots, in 1931, conjured up “scenes of devastation,” that The
Leader, an Indian newspaper with a pro-Congress Party slant, daily depicted in April editions of
the newspaper.5

3

M.K. Gandhi, “Cawnpore and its Lesson.” Young India XIII, no. 14 (1931): 6.
Findings of the Committee appointed to hold a departmental enquiry into the conduct of the subordinate police
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The Leader, “Devastation at Cawnpore,” April 9, 1931; The Leader, “Scenes of Devastation,” April 11, 1931; The
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documented in The Leader, see Appendix I.
4
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What is remembered now of the Kanpur Riots, however, is that in its aftermath, a small
group of prominent Congress Party members wrote a report about what had happened.
Paralleling the British investigation into the causes and course of the riot, Purushottam Das
Tandon, Khwaja Abdul Majid, T. A. K. Sherwani, Zaraful-Mulk, Pandit Sunderlal and Bhagwan
Das crafted the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. All six authors were well-known members of
the All-India Congress Committee and were involved in the United Provinces Congress
Committees. Beginning on April 11th, ten days after the riots had ceased, they began “sittings, for
recording evidence in a couple of rooms kindly placed at the disposal of the Committee by the
authorities of the Gaya Prasad Library.”6 Bhagwan Das recollected:
From the 12th onwards, some members of the Committee used to go round daily for local
inspections, spending about four hours each day in this work, recording notes of what
they saw and heard, also addressing small gatherings on the need for and the way of
harmony and peace. In the afternoons, they sat in the Gaya Prasad Library from 3 p.m. till
8, 9, sometimes 10 p.m., recording evidences.7
Their work in Kanpur lasted until May 25th when, after completing the interviews, they shifted to
Benares where they remained for the next 109 days until September 19th.8
As the authors began to make sense of the Kanpur riots, what had initially began as an
investigation into riot events evolved into a “historical retrospect covering the Muslim and the
British periods…intended to show the development of the social and political forces which
[were] responsible for the present situation.”9 The expanded scope of the project justified the
“nearly two months of collection of evidence and three months of writing” that Das explained

6

Bhagwan Das. Memorandum of Work (1931), reprinted in N. Gerald Barrier, ed., Roots of Communal Politics
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could not be “grudged in a matter of such vital consequences.”10 The Kanpur Riot Commission
Report was organized into three parts. The first and most substantial part was an overview of
Hindu-Muslim relations dating back to 630 A.D when the first Muslim colonies were established
in India. The second component was a daily narrative of the Kanpur Riots while the third part
consisted of a list of remedial measures to correct Hindu-Muslim antagonism. It was the first
section that was the most controversial and largely the reason why the Report was banned upon
its publication. “On April 29th, a crate of 190 advance copies were seized just before dispatch to
Calcutta. Acting hurriedly, the police confiscated the copies as ‘unauthorized newssheets’ on the
grounds that the publication was a Congress document and therefore fell under the provision of
emergency legislation.”11 In a memo to the Imperial Home Department, the British official
involved explained, “the thesis of all these chapters may be summed up as follows. HinduMuslim enmity, which never existed at all before 1800 A.D, is a creation of the British
Government for its own selfish ends.”12 The Kanpur Riot Commission Report was received by
governmental outcry in the nascent phase of its publication and as it became increasingly
controversial, the denouement was a Report that became more famed than the subject it covered.
Forgetting the Kanpur Riots, Remembering the Report
In the annals of Indian nationalist history, the Congress Report occupies a significant
place. In his introduction to the 1976 reprint of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Roots of
Communal Politics, N. Gerald Barrier notes the Report “marks an important phase in nationalist
historiography” because it represented the authors’ “systematic efforts to come to grips with the
stages [of] Hindu-Muslim interaction.”13 Gyanendra Pandey, author of The Construction of
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4
Communalism in North India (1990), writes, “the Committee’s Report contains perhaps the most
elaborate contemporary nationalist statement on the history of Hindu-Muslim relations in the
subcontinent.”14 Bipan Chandra describes his work, Communalism in Modern India (1984), as
“basically a work of synthesis; and the ideas and analytical insights of a large number of authors
have influenced it or, in many cases, have been incorporated within it…This has been
particularly true of the pioneering work of Jawaharlal Nehru, K.B. Krishna, Beni Prasad…and
the Kanpur Riots Enquiry Committee appointed by Congress in 1931.”15 All three authors cite
the Congress Report as being fundamental to an understanding of communalism. Even though
the Report was released more than seventy years ago, celebratory receptions continue to greet
reprints. On April 23, 2006, the National Book Trust of India (NBT) celebrated the release of an
Urdu translation of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report entitled Firqavarna Mas’ala
(Communal Problem). Founded in 1957 by the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the
National Book Trust of India was an autonomous organization that received governmental
funding to promote book reading across the nation. With respect to the reprint, the editor noted,
in the June 2006 NBT newsletter, “the Report is a most valuable document on the reasons and
factors responsible for the rise and spread of communalism in the country.”16 From the time it
was published until today, the Kanpur Riot Commission Report continues to play an important
role in discussions on Hindu-Muslim relations.
What has been obscured by the glorification of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report is
the Kanpur Riots. In historians’ rush to examine the contents of the history included in the
Report, the impetus that motivated the Congress Report has been largely forgotten. The history
14
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of Hindu-Muslim relations in India from 630 A.D. to 1931 in the first chapter has overshadowed
the riot participants and their stories. Even the footnotes of the history have generated more
discussion than the events of the Kanpur Riots. Barrier recounts how “the disagreement over fact
and interpretation, in footnotes and in notes of dissent, shed further light on the process whereby
a group of educated Hindus and Muslims dealt with a large assortment of evidence and tried to
produce a statement acceptable to all parties.”17 Studies of historical literature on the Kanpur
riots reveal a paradox between the event and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. While the
latter has been the subject of numerous discourses on communalism, the former has virtually
been ignored in Indian histories. The Kanpur Riot Commission Report has had a major impact on
the development of nationalist historiography whereas the Kanpur riots have come to be seen as
simply another example of Hindu-Muslim conflict in the twentieth century. The subject of one of
the most studied Reports by the Congress is one of the least studied riots. In short, scholars have
not focused on the riots but rather written about the Report.
Monographs of riots in the 1920s and 1930s reveal that the events of Kanpur have not
been the subject of major historical investigations. Excepting the reprint of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report in N. Gerald Barrier’s book, Roots of Communal Politics and subsequent
releases of reprints, no other narrative of the events of the riots exist.18 While the Kanpur riots
are not unique in this sense—the 1920s saw Hindu-Muslim relations deteriorate to the tune of
twenty-eight instances of sectarian strife, not all of which have been documented in separate
monographs—what makes the Kanpur riots interesting is that the Kanpur Riot Commission

17
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Report has generated so much controversy while its initial purpose to recount the Kanpur riots
has been unremembered.19 The Kanpur Riot Commission Report, however, is bound up in the
Kanpur Riots. The question this thesis attempts to answer is what specifically about the Kanpur
riots triggered the writing of the Congress Report and how and why has the Report been
remembered so well in historiography while its subject has been forgotten?
Resolving the Paradox
The answer revolves around the riot participants. They were the subject and audience for
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. When the authors of the Report began their endeavor to
explain the riots, they realized that the Kanpur Riots had occurred at a point in time when
“communal riots,” violence between Hindus and Muslims, had become part of the nationalist
jargon. The 1920s witnessed the gradual deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations with a
particularly vehement bout of violence occurring between 1923-1927. Beginning with the
Mappilla Rebellion in 1921, riots in different parts of the country affected religious relations in
other parts of the nation. Appreciating this fact, Bhagwan Das, in his memorandum to the
Report, noted:
The Cawnpore [Kanpur] riots were not an isolated and unusual occurrence. The
Benares riots which preceded them by only six weeks were serious enough to
have required a full investigation. They were only put into the background by this
much greater tragedy. Other extraordinary occurrences have been taking place
since, in British as well as in Indian India, in various places. Things have come to
such a deplorable pass that riots can be caused almost at will by interested parties
wherever and whenever it may suit them.20

19
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The Congress Report was a timely intervention, intended to correct a “perverted view of history”
and erase “the conviction [that] had sunk deep into the public’s mind” that Hindu-Muslim strife
was an age long phenomenon.21 The reason why the Kanpur riots gave way to the Report was
because it was at this point, the authors discovered a new way to interpret Hindu-Muslim riots
that did not rely upon framing Hindu-Muslim relations in rancorous terms. They discovered an
alternative framework to discuss Hindu-Muslim relations that did not necessitate British rule.
Chapter One will explore this framework and argue that as the findings of the Kanpur Riot
Enquiry Committee were taken and used more ambitiously in nationalist histories, the Report
became increasingly famous while the violence of the riots was forgotten.
Drawing upon the voices of riot participants, the authors of the Congress Report had
framed their discourse in terms of the people they claimed to represent, citizens of Kanpur
unaffiliated with the Congress Party or the British Government. In other words, the authors of
the Congress Report made their work the medium by which the people were able to tell their
stories. The day-by-day account of the riots was presented in the quotations of riot participants,
and using their words, the authors of the Congress Report were able to show how the people’s
thoughts and the Congress Party’s platform were indistinguishable. Chapter Two will elaborate
on these findings while tracing the actions of ordinary citizens of Kanpur during the riots.
The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report called upon the people to overturn
two justifications of British rule; first, that Hindu-Muslim strife was an ongoing problem in
India, and second, British rule was necessary for the maintenance of peace. While riot
participants successfully overturned these two assumptions, the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report went one step further, extrapolating that the Congress Party was free from
any “communal” feelings. The words of riot participants do not agree with this claim and
21
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Chapter Three will examine what can be gleaned from the quotations used in the Report as well
as those included in a “Note of Dissent” by one author, Maulana Zaraful-Mulk.
My overarching argument is that the Report became a famed piece of nationalist writing
because it was the first attempt by the Congress Party to comprehensively state their position on
Hindu-Muslim relations while the Kanpur Riots became unimportant because it was only the
vehicle through which the Congress authors presented their findings. Yet, the riots were
important because they gave the authors the opportunity to couch their discovery in the voices of
riot participants. The authors sought to cement their position as the people’s representative
through the Report but were not ultimately successful when the voices of riot participants did
wholly resonate with their claims; to a certain extent, riot participants held the Congress Party
responsible for increasing Hindu-Muslim tensions.
The Evolution of this Study
When I began this project more than a year and a half ago, my intention was not to study
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. I expected to use the source to aid my investigation of the
Kanpur Riots not to evolve into the subject of my investigation. I have my fieldwork in the
National Archives of India and conversations with my thesis advisor to thank for leading me to
discover the richness of the Report.
My time in India, August 3, 2007-September 3, 2007, allowed me to access the private
papers of British officials involved in the riots, government correspondences, the British
Commission Report in the National Archives of India and examine two newspapers, The
Statesman and The Leader in the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi. Every
aforementioned source discussed, if not decried, the official inaction during the riots. In 1931,
the Kanpur Riots were not only notable for the tremendous loss of life but also the moral

9
illegitimacy of the British Government in the aftermath for failing to take control during the
strife. Yet, when I consulted secondary sources, these two facets of the Kanpur Riots were
overshadowed by the publication of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. Histories of modern
India cited the historical findings of the Report more than they delved into the Report’s narrative
of what had happened during the riots.22 What I discovered was the paradox between the impact
of the Kanpur Riots in 1931 and how the Kanpur Riots have been remembered today.
As I began to outline my thesis in the September of last year, I realized that the
allegations of police inaction during the riots were undisputed and the British response in Kanpur
was not unique. In essence, what had captured the media and government’s attention in 1931
were facts that left little room for historical interpretation. My initial idea of assigning culpability
for the Kanpur Riots dissolved and I faced the problem of providing a context for the paradox
between the memory of the Kanpur Riots and how they were written about in 1931. During a
meeting with my thesis advisor, I recall him asking what the assumptions of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report were. His questions led me to re-examine the contents of the second part of
the Report, the daily narrative of the Kanpur Riots, and as I documented each quotation by a riot
participant, I made the discovery that shaped my thesis: the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
was the Congress Party’s attempt to portray themselves as the people’s representative and their
efforts were only partially successful when some of the riot participants did not agree.
I hope the following three chapters illuminate the impact the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report while establishing how the people of Kanpur are critical to an understanding of its
historical significance. Collectively, these three chapters explore a piece of nationalist writing
22
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that has long dominated discussions of communalism and nationalism. By making the riot
participants the centerpiece of my thesis, I hope to draw the reader’s attention to the way the
Kanpur riots have been remembered and the dichotomy between the people and the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report.

11

CHAPTER ONE

THE MOMENTUM OF THE KANPUR RIOT COMMISSION REPORT

“The Kanpur riots were only a most violent manifestation of a deep-seated disease
which has been growing actively for the last ten or twelve years, out of germs fostered in
the body politic of India, for some generations at least. From the conditions we saw and
the evidence we recorded, we became convinced that mere temporary palliatives would
be of no avail, and that by confining efforts only to areas of violent repercussions the
Congress would be wasting energy.” 23
Bhagwan Das, Chairman of the Congress Committee

Introduction
Perhaps the Kanpur Riots present a valid paradox. By 1931, sectarian strife had become
a common phenomenon in India and from a bird’s eye perspective of Hindu-Muslim relations,
the Kanpur Riots were a blip in a long sequence of religious clashes. The Kanpur Riots, in some
respects, were unremarkable. Yet, the Kanpur riots led to the Congress Report. The violence in
Kanpur was the reason the Congress at Karachi on March 31st passed a resolution “appoint[ing] a
Committee to discover the causes of the tension and to take such measures as may be necessary
to heal the breach and to prevent the poison from spreading to the adjoining areas and
districts.”24 The Kanpur Riots spurred the Congress Party to recognize that religious strife had
become a nationwide phenomenon where deteriorating religious relations in one part of the
country could affect religious relations in a different part of the country. The question then
remains: why has the memory of one of the major religious riots in the 1930s faded while the

23
24
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Congress authored Kanpur Riot Commission Report become such an important text? To put it
briefly, why does this paradox exist?
The answer lies within the pages of the Report and is bound up in the context of
sectarian strife in the 1920s. The riots occurred at a time when nationalist leaders such as
Jawaharlal Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi decried the primacy of religion over nationalism. The
Kanpur Riot Commission Report was a formalization of a number of findings that had already
been articulated by the intelligentsia. The Report was a comprehensive statement of ideas and
feelings that had long been expressed before its creation. In his introduction to the reprint of the
Report, Gerald N. Barrier maintained, “the attempt to reinterpret the evolution of communalism
constituted a major document in itself…The overall handling of data and the systematic effort to
come to grips with the stages in Hindu-Muslim interaction are vital. They mark an important
phase in nationalist historiography.”25 Occurring after a decade of religious strife, the Kanpur
Riot Commission Report was formulated as a rejoinder to the increasing sectarian strife “which
appeared to be deteriorating with each passing year.”26
The findings of the Commission revolved around the argument that Hindus and
Muslims had been moving toward a synthesis that was disrupted by the British who actively
sought to instigate tension and conflict. This version of history, formalized in the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report, became part of the nationalist school of history. The fundamental tenets of
this type of history “emphasized not only “tolerance” and synthesizing capacities that had gone
into the making of Indian civilization but also the automatic commitment of India’s inhabitants –
older and newer to the soil of the land and the Indian nation.”27 The nationalist version of
history, in short, stressed how India’s inhabitants shared an innate “Indian-ness” that connected
25
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them to each other and the land. This view of history was first propagated by the authors of the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report and then taken and used more ambitiously in later secular
histories of India. Nationalist authors such as Jawaharlal Nehru (1936), Beni Prasad (1946),
Nilakanta Sastri (1950), Bipan Chandra (1969), S.N Sen (1979), S.K. Ghosh (1987), and S.R
Bhat (1990) would take the framework presented in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and use
it to write about Indian history. This framework was a nationalist rejection of colonial
formulations that, for the first time ever, provided a formal nationalist statement on HinduMuslim relations that continues to be invoked today.
This chapter will resolve the paradox between the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and
the Kanpur Riots. In Part I, I will present a detailed overview of religious relations in northern
India from 1920-1931. The purpose of this history is not to recount every incident of religious
tension that occurred in the decade preceding the Kanpur riots but rather to depict how sectarian
strife became increasingly virulent. I will contextualize the Kanpur Riot Commission Report to
the events of the 1920s to argue that it was a response to this decade. Part II will centrally build
on Part I by showing how the Report challenged colonial assumptions on Indian history and
offered an alternative perspective to interpreting medieval India. The authors argued that, instead
of conflict, this period was marked by synthesis and Hindu-Muslim amity. Part III will chart how
the Report influenced the writing of Indian history through each subsequent decade following the
Kanpur riots. I will show how nationalist historians borrowed the framework of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report to interpret medieval and modern India. These three sections will explain the
significance of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report by examining the endurance of the
framework the authors created to view Hindu-Muslim relations.

14
Part I: The Context of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report: the 1920’s
The Mappilla Rebellion set the tone for the 1920s. Coming after the postponement of the
Nationalist Movement by Mahatma Gandhi, the rebellion was in essence, “the culmination of a
long series of Mapilla ‘outrages’ carried on for six months by peasant bands.”28 The Mappillas
were the Muslims of Malabar, a region in southern India located between the Arabian Sea and
the Western Ghats, and these “outrages” they committed were largely crimes against landlords,
Europeans, and recent Hindu converts to Islam who had reconverted to Hinduism.29 In Malabar,
the landlords and moneylenders were predominantly Hindu while the tenants, Mappilas, were
largely peasants. The “class cleavage and antagonism” based along religious lines were sources
of tension and numerous monographs of the riot document how mullas (Islamic priests) could
successfully incite sectarian violence by pointing to this economic fact.30 The violence began in
August 1921 and continued into 1922. During that time, a government force comprising of
“almost two brigades of infantry and 700 special police” was raised to oppose the 10,000
Mappilas.31 The strife officially ended on February 25, 1922 when British authorities removed
martial law. In the aftermath:
Battle casualties totaled 169 on the government side whilst about 4000 rebels were killed
or wounded… According to official figures, 320 Hindu temples were destroyed in the
course of the rebellion and 900 Hindus forcibly converted to Islam in Ernad alone. Of
some 20,000 refugees who fled the zone of rebellion, the great majority were Hindus.32
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Stories of the atrocities spread across the nation and “four months later, when the full impact of
the Mappilla outbreak was beginning to be seen,” Gandhi exhorted his readership in Young India
to believe that “nationalism is greater than sectarianism…in that sense we are Indians first and
Hindus, Mussulmans, Parsis and Christians after.”33 The Mappilla Uprising evoked a nationalist
response from Gandhi in the sense that he used it as a lesson to emphasize national ties over
religious ties.34
As sectarian strife increased throughout the decade, the dominion of nationalism over
religion would become a hallmark of Gandhi and Nehru’s speeches and writings. In an article
entitled “Hindus and Moplahs [Mappillas]” in his newspaper Young India, Gandhi wrote:
When a Hindu or Musulman does evil, it is evil done by an Indian to an Indian, and each
of us must personally share the blame and try to remove the evil. There is no other
meaning to unity than this. Nationalism is nothing, if it is not at least this. Nationalism is
greater than sectarianism. And in that sense we are Indians first and Hindus and
Musalmans, Parsis and Christians after.35
Gandhi hoped to broach what he viewed as a hierarchy between national identity and religious
identity. His comments called upon his readership to put aside religious differences in favor of
building a national (meaning, all-inclusive) body politic. In his 1936 autobiography, Nehru
elaborated on Gandhi’s distinction over the primacy of Indian identity over religious identity. He
used the subordinate position of religion in comparison to politics to make a critique about the
nationalist movement. In a chapter entitled “Communalism Rampant,” Nehru argued, “the want
of clear ideals and objectives in our struggle for freedom undoubtedly helped the spread of
communalism. The masses saw no clear connection between their day-to-day suffering and the
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fight for swaraj.”36 Nehru maintained that the growth of Hindu-Muslim tension was due to a
failure in the political process aimed at achieving independence and corrections needed to be
made. That nationalism had been subordinated to religious communities was a problem and
nationalist leaders such as Nehru and Gandhi hoped to rectify this issue. Commenting on the
results of Nehru and Gandhi’s efforts, Pandey wrote, “sometime around the 1920s… India came
to be seen very much more as a collection of individuals, of Indian ‘citizens’ rather than as a
collection of communities.”37 However, even while some of the foremost members of the
Congress Party began to conceptualize Indians possessing some innate sense of “Indian-ness,”
episodes of religious strife continued to occur across the country.
In the aftermath of the Mappilla Uprising, riots in Multan and Ajmer broke out, the
former in 1921 and the latter one year later. The year 1923 saw eight riots break out in
Sahranpur, Multan, Amritsar, Multan (again), Sindh, Jubbulpur, Agra and Rae-Bareli.38 In his
book, Communalism in Modern India, Bipan Chandra calculated that “during 1923-26, the four
year period of maximum communal tension before 1946, there were 72 major communal riots,
which gives an average figure of one riot every 20 days for the vast continent-sized and heavily
populated country.”39 The primacy of religion over nationalism appeared to be complete during
this decade. In his autobiography, Nehru recounted:
Far more important [than his illness] was the progressive deterioration of Hindu-Muslim
relations, in North India especially. In the bigger cities a number of riots took place,
brutal and callous in the extreme. The atmosphere of distrust and anger bred new causes
of dispute which most of us had never heard of before. Previously a fruitful source of
discord had been the question of cow sacrifice, especially on Bakr-id-day…But now a
fresh cause friction arose, something that was ever present, ever recurring. This was the
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question of music before mosques. Objection was taken by the Muslims to music or any
noise which interfered with their prayer in their mosques.40
The “fresh cause” Nehru cited would become a generalized reason for the outbreak of religious
strife. Acts of individual religious violence from 1923-1927 would lose their individual
significance as they were recounted en masse as the period “marking the worst years of
communal violence” before the 1947 partition.41 It was at this time when religious riots were
becoming so common that acts of religious strife were seen as linked to one another.
To counteract this problem, Gandhi sought to defuse Hindu-Muslim strife across the
country through fasts, visits, and public exhortations to end the violence. In February of 1924,
he spent three months in Bombay discussing sectarian strife with other leaders and drafting
Congress proposals to better Hindu-Muslim relations. A few months later, he “commenced a fast
in Mahomed Ali’s house in Delhi on September 17, [1924], creating the atmosphere for a Unity
Conference, which passed, on September 27, a resolution deploring the strife which was
spreading, condemning the riots as barbarous and contrary to religion and appointing a board of
arbitrators who would decide disputes between the two communities...”42 Five months later,
Gandhi traveled to Rawalpindi to persuade Hindus and Muslims to live peacefully in February of
1925. Although less than a month later, on March 7, he declared, “for the time being I have put
away in my cupboard this Hindu-Muslim tangle,” the Congress’ response to the increasing
violence had already been formulated.43 The Congress Party’s reaction to the increasing
violence was to host Unity Conferences, gatherings engaging both Hindus and Muslims to
resolve contentious issues. In Nehru’s words, “during the middle ‘twenties many attempts were
40
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made to settle the communal problem by mutual talks and discussions-‘Unity Conferences’ they
were called.”44 He recollected:
The most notable of these was the conference convened by M. Mohamad Ali, the
Congress President for the year, in 1924, and held in Delhi under the shadow of
Gandhiji’s twenty-one day fast. There were many earnest and well-meaning
people at these conferences, and they tried hard to come to an agreement. Some
pious and good resolutions were passed, but the basic problem remained
unsolved. It could not be solved by those conferences, for a solution could not be
reached by a majority of votes but by virtual unanimity, and there was always
extremists of various groups present whose idea of a solution was a complete
submission of all others to their views.45
Nehru’s appraisal was accurate. Although the 1920s saw well-intentioned efforts to end HinduMuslim strife, oftentimes, riots would follow on the heels of these conferences, negating any
long-term influences they might have had. Referring to the 1924 conference, Nehru wrote in his
autobiography:
The Delhi Unity Conference of 1924 was hardly over when a Hindu-Muslim riot
broke out in Allahabad. It was not a big riot. As such riots go, insofar as casualties
were concerned, but it was painful to have these troubles in one’s hometown. I
rushed back with others from Delhi to find that the actual rioting was over; but the
aftermath, in the shape of bad blood and court cases, lasted a long time. I forget
why the riot begun. That year, or perhaps later, there was also some trouble over
Ram Lila celebrations at Allahabad.” Probably because of restrictions about
music before mosques...46
Nehru’s comments illustrated two important facets of sectarian strife. First, Unity Conferences
did not have a lasting impact across the nation, and second, by 1924, music playing before
mosques had already become a generic cause for conflict. This cause had been generalized to the
extent that the reasons for violence had become superfluous to understand the event itself.
The 1920s continued to see a number of Hindu-Muslim clashes. Documenting the
examples of sectarian strife in the decade, Chandra charted how actions connected with the
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Congress led nationalist movement brought about bloodshed for both Hindus and Muslims. He
wrote:
The end of each of the three waves of nationalist struggle-1920-22,1930-34,1942-43added a feeling of political frustration and helplessness to the already frustrated existence
of the people, especially of the petty bourgeoisie. The communalists and other
reactionaries were able to use the real-life insecurity, anxiety, frustration and fears of the
petty bourgeoisie and other social strata to attack other Indian groups, who were held
responsible for their deprivation, etc.47
In Chandra’s view, the “petty bourgeoisie” could be manipulated to cause violence. They were
responsible for communalism. Beginning in the 1920s, clashes between Muslims and Hindus
continued to escalate although religious reasons may not have accounted for the fighting.
Chandra explained, “repeatedly as in 1915 and 1922 in Multan division, in 1926 in Rawalpindi
district and in 1930 in Ferozepur and Multan districts, the Muslim peasants arose under the
communal banner, directing their anger against the moneylender and his bahis (account books,
where the evidence of their indebtedness was recorded).”48 Although economic grievances may
have accounted for causes of conflict, the riots were recorded in the literature of the time as
being part of a religious problem. Nehru, in his autobiography, provided a neat summation of
riots. He explained:
One is apt to exaggerate the significance of these riots in a few northern cities. Most of
the towns and cities and the whole of rural India carried on peacefully, little affected by
these happenings, but the newspapers naturally gave great prominence to every petty
communal disturbance. It is perfectly true, however that communal tension and bitterness
increased in the city masses.49
Because the riots became famous as conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, they became
important because of their connection with religious strife. As clashes continued in the 1920s,
this perception of conflicts revolving around religious differences became increasingly acute.
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Riots in the last years of the 1920s and early 1930s continued in the same vein. Chandra
noted, “the Bombay City communal riot of 1929 had features of a class war by proxy, a conflict
between strikers and blacklegs. To break a strike in oil companies, the owners brought in Pathan
strike breakers, leading to a fight between blacklegs and the strikers and their workers
supporters.”50 In his book, The Construction of Colonialism in North India, Pandey remarked,
“certain Hindu-Muslim riots in 1930-31 were isolated instances of class struggle fought in
communal guise or fundamentally agrarian jacqueries or the fury of the urban poor.”51 HinduMuslim tensions had become a cloak for any disturbance. Regardless of the cause of violence,
what was clear by 1931 was that a series of clashes fought between Hindus and Muslims were
deriving their political significance from the religious affiliation of the participants. Pandey
wrote, “towards the end of the 1920s the Government of India drew up elaborate lists of HinduMuslim riots that had occurred in the country in the recent past. From one of these, we learn that
there were 112 serious ‘disturbances’ between 1923 and 1927, which left approximately 450
dead and 5000 more wounded. The year 1929 produced a carnage in Bombay….Official
[British] statistics put the number of casualties in Bombay at 184 and 948 wounded.”52 These
statistics were alarming and evidenced the growing number of clashes affecting the country.
The 1920s had become famous for the outpouring of violence that engulfed the country.
In his survey of modern Indian history, Sumit Sarkar listed a number of riots that had been
instigated by “the recurrent ostensible issue [of the] Muslim demand for stopping mosques, and
Hindu pressures for ban on cow-slaughter.”53 Included in his tally were:
The violent anti-Hindu outburst at Kohat in the N.W. Frontier province in September
1924, with 155 killed. Three waves of riots in Calcutta between April and July 1926,
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[with a casualty count] of 138….[ there were] disturbances the same year in Dacca,
Patna, Rawalpindi, and Delhi; and no less than 91 communal outbreaks in Uttar Pradesh,
the worst affected province, between 1923 and 1927.54
The opening of a new decade did little to evoke a positive image of Hindu-Muslim relations in
India. Prior to the 1931 Kanpur riots, outbreaks of violence occurred in Benares, Mirzapur and
Agra in the early part of that year. While the causes of the three riots differed, what was common
to all were explanations that drew upon the commonly held reasons for strife, namely music
before mosques and cow-slaughter.55 Generalized sources of conflict had become recurrent
reasons for violence and when the Kanpur riots occurred in 1931, the authors of the British
Commission Report noted, “all these things had their echoes in Cawnpore [Kanpur] as over the
rest of the province and beyond it, [and] in Cawnpore [Kanpur] careful and impartial observers
had by now concluded that feelings had reached such a stage of bitterness and tension that an
outbreak awaited only the occasion and time.”56 In short, the authors of the British Commission
Report, to some extent, inferred the riots were inevitable.
While the inevitability of the Kanpur riots cannot be proven, what can be said is that at
the outset of the riots, a series of clashes between Muslims and Hindus had broken out across the
country. Though the causes of conflict may have been outside the realm of religious differences,
they were publicized as such and their significance became entangled in questions of the
compatibility of Hindus and Muslims. Although Gandhi and Nehru decried the primacy of
religious identity over a national Indian identity, by the early 1930s, it appeared as though the
issue of religious strife was not going to be resolved soon. It was in this atmosphere that the
Kanpur riots broke out on March 24th, 1931 and when the violence had finally ceased six days
later, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report took it upon themselves to address the
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issue of increasing religion strife and explain Hindu-Muslim relations in a way that questioned
colonial formulations.
Part II: Conceptualizing Hindu-Muslim Relations
In the foreword to the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Bhagwan Das, the principal
author, noted that the expanded scope of the Report “arose from an observation that we feel that
unless people begin to see the past in a truer perspective it will be very difficult or well–nigh
impossible to restore mutual confidence and to arrive at a real and permanent solution of the
present differences.”57 Das was justifying the inclusion of a 293 page-history of Hindu-Muslim
relations, which he described as “an attempt to remove historical misconceptions [which was] the
most indispensable step in the real solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem.”58 The authors of the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report were fully cognizant of the atmosphere preceding the violence
and their objective was to overturn colonial formulations about Hindu-Muslim relations. In doing
so, they embarked upon a massive reconstruction of the history of Hindu-Muslim relations, and
created a framework that continues to be invoked today. This section will document the major
conclusions drawn by the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report.
The authors began questioning the colonial interpretation of Hindu-Muslim relations by
discussing “The Muslim Period,” an era characterized by Islam’s peaceful spread in India and its
subsequent peaceful coexistence with Hinduism. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report recorded, “Islam spread peacefully practically in all her provinces…and the followers of
the two religions lived in perfect harmony.”59 Hindu-Muslim amity was further enhanced by
Muslims’ full integration into India. “Almost in every province Islam preceded the establishment
of Muslim political power by centuries and the Muslim colonists [were] found to live and
57
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participate in every sphere of Indian life.”60 These statements served two purposes. First, they
refuted a contentious belief that Islam had spread through forced conversions “by sword,” and
second, they showed that Muslims in India could be identified as Indians as early as 630 A.D
when “the Arab colonies in India automatically became Muslim colonies, and the profound
moral and economic impulse that Islam gave to the life of the Arabs had its immediate reactions
in India by increasing the number and the importance of these colonies.”61 Muslims could not be
regarded as foreigners because of their early arrival and integration into “every sphere of Indian
life.”
As evidenced above, Hindu-Muslim relations in this era were marked by friendliness and
cooperation. The authors of the Kanpur Enquiry Commission Report noted, “it is obvious that
before the establishment of Muslim rule, Islam had already secured a firm footing in India, and
Muslims and Hindus were living side by side and in perfect amity practically all over the
country.”62 They supported their claims with examples of economic and political partnerships
“from Cape Comorin to Hindu Kush,” noting that merchants and preachers had dispersed
between these two respectively southernmost and northernmost parts of India.63 This evidence
was further used to justify the postulation:
If the antagonism and intolerance we find today had been inherent in the two systems,
this was evidently the period when they would have found their fullest expression. …The
outline of social conditions above indicates that Hinduism even in its most orthodox
form, if left to itself, was incapable of generating forces of social bitterness towards
communities outside its own social organization…If we find such forces existing now,
they must necessarily be of later growth and foreign importation.64
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The amity characterizing Hindu-Muslim relations before the arrival of the British is used to
highlight a thinly veiled attack on the role of the British in propagating sectarian strife. This
tactic would become a hallmark feature of nationalist histories featuring discussions of HinduMuslim relations.
In the final section concluding the first chapter of the history, the authors of the Report
contrasted perceptions of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity. Their objective was to overturn
colonial formulations regarding the tenets and spread of all three religions. What this amounted
to was a recital of the horrors of the Crusades in the Middle Ages and an explicit denunciation of
the supposed bigotry associated with Islam. They wrote: “of the many wrong impressions
prevailing at the present, one which is the most fruitful source of bitterness and ill-will is the
impression that Islam is inherently bigoted and intolerant…History does not seem to justify us in
giving a major share of it to Islam.”65 The two key messages of the chapter are first that Islam
and Hinduism have no inherent characteristics that set them in opposition to each other and
second, “foreign importation” plays a major role in instigating strife. These themes largely sum
up the message of the next two chapters in which the authors ground their discussions in the
“social and religious condition of India in the eighth century” and political developments during
this era.66
According to the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the next phase of
Hindu-Muslim relations involved a shift from coexisting peacefully in India to increased
interaction between the two religions. They recounted, “the two communities found it possible
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not only to tolerate each other but to live and grow together with the utmost cordiality and cooperation.”67 Hinduism and Islam benefited from the closer relationship. “Hindus and
Musalmans were constantly influencing each other, affecting and changing each other’s ways in
every walk of life.”68 The social synthesis benefited both parties involved. Though mentioning
discrepancies that lay between elites and masses of both religions, the authors of the Kanpur Riot
glossed over socio-economic differences that may have separated different communities and
instead broadly highlighted tendencies to co-exist peacefully. They personified India as a mother
for whom “the Hindu and Muslim communities cooperated whole-heartedly in her political and
economic advancement.”69 Indians, as seen through this description, were tolerant people whose
commitment to religious tolerance had endured for centuries.
The idea that Hindus and Muslims peacefully co-existed hurriedly ends in 1815 when the
“British period” commenced. No longer do the authors of the Report focus on the “amalgamation
of two cultures” but rather stress how both Hindus and Muslims became pawns in the British
policy of “divide and rule.”70 They use the words of former British leaders to articulate the
policy of “divide and rule” as it is devised by them. Quoting the minutes of Lord Elphinstone,
Governor of Bombay in 1858, they cite, “Divide et impera’ was the old Roman motto and it
should be ours.”71 The authors go on to quote Lieutenant John Coke who states, “our endeavor
should be to uphold in full force the (for us fortunate) separation which exists between the
different religions and races; not to endeavor to amalgamate them. ‘Divide et impera’ should be
the principle of the Indian Government.”72 The words are damning and serve to bolster the
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authors’ claim of British culpability in promulgating religious violence. The authors of the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report recounted a litany of British actions that forced Hindu-Muslim
relations to deteriorate. Among the actions was the “abolition of Persian as the Court language”
which had the effect of causing the education of Muslims and Hindus to diverge with Hindus
receiving a more Anglicized education and consequently more opportunities in the civil
service.73 The most harmful policy, however, according to the authors was the implementation of
separate electorates for Hindus and Muslims.74 This system “was the crowning measure of the
divide-and-rule policy. The wedge thus devised was by its very nature calculated to obstruct the
growth of Nationalism and could at will, by well-directed blows, be made to sink deeper and
deeper into the body politic.”75 How the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report viewed
the impact of separate electorates is best described in their own words:
After this nothing could be done but to let things work. The religious tension was already
there; the political sections had been successfully divided; the civic and economic life
were too effectively in hand; all that remained was, when [divide-and-rule] policy
demanded, to pull a wire here and a wire there at psychological moments to produce the
desired explosion. In fact, so dependable were the batters and so charged remained the
atmosphere with destructive energy that, as we shall see, huge explosions, were suddenly
created at moments, when politically and even in their religious moods the communities
were most united. And through these explosions, well-managed and well-timed, the rising
tides of the national movement as they rolled against the Government one after the other,
were successfully attacked, weakened and even broken.76
The effect of separate electorates was multifold. Blaming the British authorities for allowing
civic, political, religious and social lines to be drawn between Muslims and Hindus, the authors

73

Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 172.
Separate electorates was a system introduced by the Government of India Act of 1909 whereby a certain
percentage of seats in the electorate were reserved for Muslims and only Muslims could vote for the office-holders
who would take them. Basically, the system set aside seats for Muslims and prevented Hindus from either voting for
those seats or being elected to them.
75
Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 204.
76
Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 205.

74

27
of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report depicted the British Government as morally corrupt for
not only failing to safeguard peoples’ liberties but even provoking “explosions” among them.
While documenting actions that drove a wedge between Hindus and Muslims, the
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report portrayed the two groups as one victimized
population. “Muslims began to realize to their great sorrow and discomfiture that the British
Government, whom they supported in India and considered their saviour against the Hindus, was
merely using them as its tool to secure its position in India…”77 British policy had undermined
and betrayed Indian interests. It was the imposition of British policy that had resulted in religious
intolerance. As depicted in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Hindu-Muslim relations were
based on three tenets. First, Hindus and Muslims did not bear any grudges toward members of
the opposite community until the establishment of British rule. Second, they were part of a
population that had been collectively wronged by the British and third, their ability for self-rule
was only constrained by British policies. These three facets of Hindu-Muslim relations
overturned and cast away the justification for the British Raj, namely that British authority was
necessary to prevent sectarian strife.
Part III: Examining the Relevance of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
The Kanpur Riot Commission Report had undermined colonial formulations about
Hindu-Muslim relations through a historical survey of India’s past. The authors of the Report
offered an alternative framework to view Hindu-Muslim relations that maintained Hindus and
Muslims could live peaceably and that sectarian strife was a result of British efforts. What the
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report did was address the emergence of communalism
as a threat to the National Movement. “Communalism” is one of the most highly charged words
in works discussing India and this section will examine the development of the term and its
77
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continued use in nationalist historiographies. My argument is that the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report remains relevant today because its conclusions, offering a nationalist response to colonial
charges of inherent religious tensions between Islam and Hinduism, continue to be cited in
discussions of Hindu-Muslim relations.
“Communalism” was a term coined by the British to describe religious relations
exclusively in India. As Pandey noted, the term was “never applied to feudal Europe or to other
pre-capitalist societies where religiosity was no narrower and strife between members of
religious persuasions nor rare… But was reserved for the analysis of social and political conflicts
in the “backward” part of the colonial and post-colonial world.”78 Communalism, then, was a
derogatory term. For colonialists, communalism captured a “basic feature of Indian society,” one
that belittlingly portrayed Indians as irrational, violent and religiously intolerant.79 From the
British perspective, all violent disturbances could be simplified as religious riots with the
contextual motives becoming unimportant, as the root cause was already known. In the preface
to his book, The Construction of Communalism in North India, Pandey described communalism
as “a product of a colonial interpretation of history in which religious assemblages (especially
“Hindus” and “Muslims”) existed as sharply differentiated and always already constituted and
antagonistic communities whose history consisted of period bouts of bloodletting.”80 British
authority was necessary insomuch as Indians could not be trusted to rule themselves.
Communalism provided certain stereotypes and typecasts which colonial histories implemented.
The impact on colonial histories was that the colonialist interpretation of communalism became
the template to view and write about Indian history.

78

Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in North India, 7.
Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in North India, 10.
80
Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in North India, 8.
79

29
Without questioning the framework of communalism, nationalists plied it into the “Other
form of nationalism.”81 Communalism consisted of “separatism, antagonism, and violence.”82 It
was an obstacle that needed to be surmounted. From the nationalist perspective, the colonialists
and a small group of native Indians were responsible for these divisive elements. Communalism
was a result of “the machinations of the colonial power” and its development in the 1920s was
characterized by the efforts of Indian nationalists to contrast it with the legitimate form of
nationalism that would give way to Lala Rajput Rai’s vision of India as “the Indian nation, such
as it is or such as we intend to build it, nether is nor will be Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, or Christian. It
will be each and all.”83 The nationalists agreed with the colonialists to the extent that they
defined communalism as a problem facing Hindus and Muslims but they disagreed on the causes
for the phenomenon. Whereas the colonialists attributed communalism to an innate characteristic
of Indians that made Hindu-Muslim tensions an age-long phenomenon, nationalists interpreted
communalism “as a problem of recent origins, as the outcome basically of economic and
political inequality and conflict and as the handiwork of a handful of self-interested elite groups
(colonial and native).”84 This disagreement between the causes of communalism would be a
prominent feature in nationalist histories that explored Hindu-Muslim relations.
The Kanpur Riot Commission Report figures into this argument on communalism
because the history within its pages was a nationalist interpretation of this phenomenon. The
authors of the Report questioned colonial formulations of Hindu-Muslim relations and offered an
alternative way to view Hindu-Muslim relations. Their efforts were unprecedented and the result,
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, was the first comprehensive statement by nationalists to
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explain Hindu-Muslim relations in a way that pointed to colonialists, rather than Indians, as
responsible for sectarian strife. Tracing the ideological genealogy of this schema, what stands out
is how this framework continues to be invoked today.
Decade-by-Decade: Following the Intellectual Genealogy of the Report
In 1936, Nehru published his autobiography. In reference to its publication, V.K. Krishna
Menon, the editor of The Unity of India, a collection of Nehru’s writing from 1937-1940
declared in his foreword, “the Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru is still the best book on
modern India, up to 1935. The objectivity and restraint that characterize Jawaharlal Nehru’s
thought and writing make the Autobiography history and not merely memoir.”85 Tracing his life
through the political developments of India, Nehru provided a glimpse of Indian history that
invoked the framework set forth by the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report only
three years after its publication. His account featured the British policy of Divide-and-Rule, drew
upon the essentialities versus non-essentialities of religious practices and rejected the purported
incompatibility of Hindus and Muslims. Nehru maintained:
Of course, the British governments in the past and the present have based their policy on
creating divisions in our ranks. Divide and rule has always been the way of empires, and
the measure of their success in this policy has also been the measure of their superiority
over those whom they exploit. We cannot complain of this or, at any rate, we ought not
be surprised at it.”86
This theme figures prominently in Nehru’s account, most visibly when he discusses conflicts
between Hindus and Muslims. Nehru wrote:
It seems amazing that a question which could be settled with mutual consideration for
each other’s feelings and a little adjustment should give rise to great bitterness and
rioting. But religious passions have little to do with reason or consideration or
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adjustments, and they are easy to fan when a third party in control can play off one group
against another.87
His comments echoed Lajpat Rai’s earlier statements regarding religious customs that could
offend either Hindus or Muslims, a facet of Hindu-Muslim relations the authors of the Kanpur
Riot Commission Report also draw upon. By putting forth this argument, Nehru advanced a
central message of the Report.
The final way Nehru framed his history of Hindu-Muslim relations was to cast away the
idea that strife is an inherent feature of Hindu-Muslim relations. In one of the final sections of his
autobiography, he contended, “stress has been laid on the ‘Muslim nation in India,’ on ‘Muslim
culture’ on the utter incompatibility of Hindu and Muslim ‘cultures.’ The inevitable deduction
from this (though it is not put baldly) is that the British must remain in India forever and ever to
hold the scales and mediate between the two ‘cultures.’88 Nehru’s reflections on India mirror
those of the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. The way he framed history is
identical to the way the authors of the Report document Hindu-Muslim relations. Only three
years after its publication, the conclusions of the Report can be found in one of the famous
Indian nationalist’s memoirs.
In 1946, Beni Prasad, in his work, India’s Hindu-Muslim Questions adopted the
framework laid out by the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report in his extensive
survey of Indian history from the “arrival of the Musalmans” to his discourse on the problems
affecting India in the 1940s.89 His opening chapter documenting how “Hinduism and Islam
Stand Face to Face, ” the “Reciprocal Influences” each share as Islam takes root in India and the
“Religious Reapprochement” mirrored the opening section titles of the Kanpur Riot
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Commission Report.90 The early sections of the history describing the same era as Prasad’s
section titles are: “Attempts at Early Synthesis,” “The Meeting of Islam and Hinduism,” and
“India Wanted a New Synthesis.”91 The titles are similar to the extent that they are
interchangeable. While the examples they cite are dissimilar, the conclusion is the same: Islam
and Hinduism coexisted peacefully. Prasad, like the authors of the Report, described the
“fusion” between Hindu and Muslim manners, customs and art, as evidence of a broader
national identity linking all Indians.92 “In all these spheres,” Prasad wrote, “there emerged by
the eighteenth century a solid and permanent achievement, basically Indian, strictly speaking,
neither Hindu nor Muslim in technique.”93 Prasad’s interpretation of early Hindu-Muslim
relations and the resulting affiliation between the two communities speaks to nationalist goal of
showing how India was an integrated socio-political entity before the British arrived. Both
Prasad and the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report “portended the existence of a
common will, a common objective, and a united resistive power.”94
The similarities between the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and Prasad’s India’s
Hindu-Muslim Questions carry through to the arrival of the British. As Nehru did in his work,
Prasad held the British responsible to some extent for the “the broader problem” of HinduMuslim that revolves around “the communal problem.”95 Prasad elaborated:
The British acquiesced in policies and actions calculated to sustain and accentuate the
differences between the communities-the omission to eradicate illiteracy and poverty,
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differential treatment, separate electorates, extraordinary delays in political
settlement…96
Although Prasad’s censure of the British is more muted than the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report’s condemnation, both blame the British Government, to some extent, for the
creation of communalism. Though Prasad never uses the specific term, “communalism,” in his
discourse, he alludes to it as the “communal problem” or “differences between communities.”97
Prasad’s discourse fits with and advances the framework established in the Report because of its
complete acceptance of the nationalists’ version of early Indian history and its censure of the
British in propagating strife.
In 1950, K.A Nikalanta Sastri, a professor of Indian history at the University of Madras
published his three-volume History of India. He declared in the preface of his third volume that
“this part deals with more live issues than its predecessors. The embers of controversy are still
warm over several questions; as far as possible I have tried to take account of all the rival points
of view, but have not hesitated to indicate my own opinions.”98 Sastri’s opinions match the
beliefs of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. His discussion on communalism highlighted the
culpability of the British in promoting sectarian strife. In a section entitled, “Communalism
Fomented,” Sastri wrote, “meanwhile Anglo-Indian officials and non-officials had got busy
setting up the Muslims and other minorities to obstruct the smooth passage of political
reform…and British Indian officialdom rejoiced at the success that had attended their wicked
intrigue.”99 Sastri evidenced the 1906 creation of the Muslim League, a reaction to the heavily
Hindu Congress Party, as an example of the “wicked intrigue.” His description resonated with
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the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report’s portrayal of the League’s founding. They
maintained:
Not content with the deadly antagonism it had thus created, the Government now
conceived a still more disastrous scheme for perpetuating it. About this time it whispered
into the ears of some responsible Muslim leaders (many of whom have since made
repentant confessions) that they should demand separate electorates…This created new
hope and a new upheaval…and an organization under the name All-India Muslim League
came into existence.100
The British Government, as characterized by both accounts, was sly and manipulative. The
similarity between History of India and the Report, however, goes further than both accounts
censuring the British for the creation of the Muslim League. The way Sastri and the authors of
the Report phrase their findings mirror each other. To a certain degree, the two accounts are
interchangeable. Sastri describes the British policy of Divide and Rule in the same manner as the
authors of the Report, evidenced by his description of the founding the Muslim League.
In 1969, Romila Thapar, Harbans Mukhia, and Bipan Chandra published a collection of
essays entitled, Communalism and the Writing of Indian History. The anthology, spanning from
ancient to modern India, discussed the development of communalism in opposition to
nationalism. The conclusions they drew evidenced Pandey’s claims about communalism and
showed how historians in the late 1960s continued to be influenced by the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report. In particular, Chandra’s essay, “Historians of Modern India and
Communalism” drew upon the framework created by the authors of the Report.101 His critiques
reflected recognition that certain assumptions regarding the nationalist account needed to be
questioned and accentuated the significance of the framework in nationalist historiography. He
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wrote, “the British use of Indian history to denigrate Indian national character and to ‘prove’
India’s unfitness for independence and democracy produced another distortion in Indian
historiography and politics. The Indians countered this unscientific and unhistorical approach
with an unhistorical approach of their own.”102 The connection between Chandra’s remark and
the purpose of the history included in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report was stated in
Bhagwan Das’ own words in the foreword. He explained that the motivation for including the
history revolved around the “part which British policy has placed in [increasing tensions] and
bringing matters to the present crisis.”103 Chandra’s point directly addressed Das’ assertion. He
speaks to the importance of addressing the underlying motivations of nationalist writing. By
doing so, he continues to make the Kanpur Riot Commission Report relevant more than thirty
years after its release.
In 1979, S.N Sen published the History of Modern India. Focusing on Bengal, Sen traced
the history of the region from 1765 to 1950 remarking in his preface that “the interplay of
events… [makes] it the most fascinating period in Indian history.”104 Because of the similarities
between his conclusions and the findings of the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report,
of note is Sen’s discussion of the “British Policy of Divide and Rule.” Describing the creation of
the Muslim League in 1908, Sen recounted “with the foundation of the Muslim League, the
cleavage between the Hindus and Muslims deepened….The result was the outbreak of
communal riots between the Hindus and the Muslims which continued to mar the relations of the
two communities.”105 Sen’s comments correspond with the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report’s findings that the League’s founding “sowed discord between the Hindu
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and Mohemmedan communities by showing the Mohemmedans special favor.”106 Sen makes the
same argument the authors of the Report formulated more than forty years earlier.
In his book, Communal Riots in India (1987), S.K Ghosh exemplified the type of
nationalist story telling in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. The purpose of his book was to
“meet the challenge unitedly,” a reference to the need for Hindu-Muslim unity to combat
religious tensions, or as termed in his tract, communalism.107 What is notable about Ghosh’s
work are the similarities between his conclusions and what the authors of the Congress Report
surmise. Beginning his narrative in pre-medieval India, Ghosh spent much of his first chapter
commenting on “the fusion of Hindu and Muslim concepts, values, customs, art, literature, music
and architecture during the past one thousand years.”108 This fusion, in his words, “is a living
objective reality. Hinduism and Islam which command the loyalty of millions of sensible and
peace-loving persons are not in conflict.”109 His words directly echo the authors of the Kanpur
Riot Commission Reports’ description of medieval India. In the Report, the section entitled “The
Muslim Period” is replete with references to the way in which “the two religions lived together
in perfect harmony.”110 Both Ghosh and the Congress authors express an interest in showing that
before the British arrived, Hinduism and Islam were not in conflict.
While the subject of Ghosh’s work were the religious riots of the 1980s, the first half of
his book was dedicated to explaining Hindu-Muslim tensions in the context of communalism. He
remarked in a section entitled, “Anatomy of Hindu-Muslim Riots:”
The very heterogeneous character of Hinduism made the Hindus less communal minded.
Though often non-communal themselves, the Hindus fell prey to religiosity and religious
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passions to oppose Muslim communalism as, for example, the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan
Sangh and Arya Samaj came into existence to oppose the communalism preached by the
Muslim League and Jamaat-e-Islami.”111
Ghosh’s words mirrored the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report’s findings that
“even in its most orthodox form, [Hinduism] if left to itself, was incapable of generating forces
of social bitterness towards communities outside its own social organization.”112 Ghosh, almost
word for word, replicates the findings of the Kanpur Riot Commission more than a half a century
earlier. What is readily apparent in Ghosh’s account is the ease in which he places communalism
at the heart of the problem. Communalism is not a foreign concept; rather as Ghosh used the
concept, it was a natural way to discuss Hindu-Muslim relations. Writing in the 1980s, he
maintained, “the trouble [religious tensions] arises when extremists try to convert this personal
belief into communal antagonism in an effort to achieve power.” Communalism, a word codified
by the nationalists in the 1920s and concretely defined in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report,
had come to be regarded as the natural framework to tackle religious strife between Hindus and
Muslims.
In 1990, S.R Bhat wrote The Problem of Hindu Muslim Conflicts. Viewed as highly
relevant for the future of India’s development, the publishers noted, “this book gives the
historical background of Hindu-Muslim conflicts in India which is threatening the very unity and
integrity of this country.”113 Bhat’s short volume documented different facets of religious strife.
What is striking about his history is the similarities it shares with the history included in the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report. In a section entitled, “A Ruse of the Britishers,” Bhat writes,
“[the British] gave a communal color to our history.” Bhat blamed British historians for
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“depict[ing] Hindus as saints and Muslims as sadists…The atrocities and oppressions of one or
two Sultans were generalized and the entire Muslim community was accused. The destruction of
Hindu temples, vandalism, poll-tax, etc., were grossly exaggerated…. They propagated that
Hindus were forcefully converted.”114 Bhat addressed a key point-that Islam spread by sword- as
a popular misconception that needs to be overcome. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report agreed and in a nearly identical passage they wrote, “acts of intolerance and persecution
perpetuated through bigotry and pride of power or policy by some Muslim rulers and
exaggerated accounts of them in our histories have raised strong feelings and created the
impression that Islam has spread by compulsion or other unfair means.”115 Both the authors of
the Report and Bhat view colonial histories as a source of misconceptions that have resulted in
sectarian strife. In 1990, more than fifty years after the Kanpur riots, the findings of the Kanpur
Riot Commission Report continue to gain credence as nationalist writers discuss Hindu-Muslim
relations in the same terms as the Report’s authors.
In the latest edition of The Construction of Communalism in North India, published in
2006, Pandey illustrated how the Kanpur Riot Commission Report continues to be remembered
in modern historiography: as an event that spawned the clearest example of how Indian
nationalists viewed Hindu-Muslim relations. What is striking about Pandey’s conclusions is that
he used the Kanpur Riot Commission Report to evidence his suppositions. He wrote,
“reconstructed histories in the 1920s were to emphasize not only ‘tolerance’ and synthesizing
capacities that had gone into the making of Indian civilization but also the automatic
commitment of India’s inhabitants –older and newer to the soil of the land and the Indian
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nation.”116 This description is a summary of the major findings of the Report and Pandey used
these types of histories to document how communalism developed in opposition to nationalism.
He additionally evidenced how the Kanpur Riot Commission Report could be seen as a
comprehensive statement of nationalist voices in the 1920s. After quoting a 1925 speech by
Lajpat Rai, a prominent Congress Party leader, Pandey, in a footnote, remarked how “The
Congress Kanpur Riots Enquiry [Kanpur Riot Commission Report] made the same point.”117
Pandey quoted at length:
The real ultimate cause of all communal tension is the exaggeration of non-essentials in
the religions. If there is any way whereby in the present conditions of life, the religious,
moral and political practice of the people can be reformed, it is the inculcation far and
wide of the fundamental truth that true self-government is Government by the higher self
in all departments of life.118
As Pandey claimed, the words almost resonate exactly with the content and phrasing of Rai’s
speech, “if we really and honestly want a United India, we, i.e., the different religious
communities in this country, shall have to make a clear distinction between the essentials and the
non-essentials in religion…”119 There is a continuation of thought from 1925 until 1931. The
Kanpur Riot Commission Report, in 2006, is used to prove a link between the communalism
voiced in the 1920s and its discussion in the Report in 1931. To put it briefly, the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report remains relevant for contemporary historians as it was upon its initial
publication in 1933.
Communalism Revisited
In The Construction of Communalism in North India, Pandey defined communalism as
“a form of colonialist knowledge. The concept stands for the puerile and the primitive-all that
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colonialism, in its own reckoning, was not.”120 Communalism was a term developed by the
British to articulate Hindu-Muslim relations as they understood it in India. Pandey termed
communalism “colonial knowledge” because he was referring to the fact that the British packed
their imperialistic notions into its definition. Communalism, then, was a lens developed by the
British to view Hindu-Muslim relations and its formulation was a way for colonialists to
understand Indians. It was a schema that had an underlying negative context. What was ironic
was how nationalists adopted the term and used it to describe religious tensions among a number
of religions in India. Pandey’s argument puts forth this paradox and his study, concluding that
“communalism” is an inadequate term, is the best examination of the term to date.
Pandey’s case study of Benares showcased how the colonial version of communalism
was enacted in historiography. The colonial histories describing the nineteenth century Benares
riots accentuated the importance of religious “sites and the ‘irrational attachment’ of natives to
them.”121 Even though Hindu-Muslim discord had not preceded the incident that it was the cause
of the conflict was taken for granted. The rioters were reduced to religious fanatics and the riots
were depicted as part of a long history of religious turmoil. The colonial narratives became “a
master narrative…acting as a sort of model for all descriptions.”122 Certain assumptions
regarding native behavior were established and a pattern of “evil clashes with evil; good
intervenes; order is restored” was put into practice.123 The Kanpur Riots fit into this discussion
because they could be substituted in for the Benares riot without much inconvenience:
Throughout the nineteenth century and for long afterwards, the colonial narrative on
communal strife tends to proceed by identifying the “first” major riot, that is, usually the
first recorded after the establishment of British rule, and then tracing a straight line
through the “last”- which of course keeps changing with the date of the writing (1904 in
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the case on Mubarakpur in the Azamgarch Gazetteer of 1909; Kanpur in 1931 in the
Government of India file on “Communal Disorders” prepared in the 1930s).124
The Kanpur riots were, in essence, indistinguishable from a number of other conflicts between
Hindus and Muslims. They were oversimplified to the extent that every other factor besides
religious strife was omitted in describing the reasons for conflict. This method of ‘riot writing’
influenced the way Indian nationalists would describe Hindu-Muslim clashes.
In Pandey’s words, “communalism and nationalism as we know them today picked up
their significance in the 1920s…to a large extent in opposition of each other.”125 This idea gains
credence in the number of nationalist writings and speeches Pandey evidences depicting
nationalist leaders exhorting their countrymen to build a nation home for both Hindus and
Muslims. He quotes Madan Mohan Malaviya; “just as Hindustan is the beloved birthplace of the
Hindus, so it is of the Muslims too…”126 Communalism threatened this vision and in the 1920s,
when the goals and methods of nationalism were being articulated by Nehru and Gandhi,
communalism became the “flogging horse of nationalism….the product of a policy of Divide and
Rule.”127 Pandey’s argument, in short, was that communalism developed side by side with
nationalism in the 1920s and during the course of its articulation, it became the enemy of
nationalism.
Yet, the term is not adequate. Communalism is a term specific to India to describe
religious relations. By nature of its colonial formulation, the word still possesses a negative
context that disparages Hindu-Muslim relations in India. When the nationalists adopted the term,
the failed to “fully appreciate its force, tentativeness or complexity.”128 Communalism was not a
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natural way to discuss Hindu-Muslim relations and when nationalists failed to recognize this
fact, they shaped the term in opposition to nationalism. What we have today is a number of
books, among them, Communalism: Handled with a Difference (2000), On Communalism and
Globalization: Offenses of the Far Right (2002), and Communalism in Secular India : A
Minority Perspective (2007), devoted to solving communalism, a problem of religious relations
seemingly unique to India.129
Conclusion
The religious riots of the 1920s paved the way for the Kanpur Riot Commission Report.
The Report was written in reaction to the number of clashes nationwide and the authors sought to
explain Hindu-Muslim strife in terms that did not characterize sectarian relations as being
permanently rancorous. Their efforts amounted to a rejection of colonial formulations about
Hindu-Muslim relations and the creation of an alternative framework that would be invoked by
nationalist historians. The connection linking nationalist histories with the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report is readily apparent. The history included in the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report became a model for how nationalist historians interpreted the past as seen through every
decade since its creation. The Report was unprecedented to the extent that it offered a
comprehensive statement of nationalist ideas expressed in the 1920s. In that sense, the Report
was a historical triumph and that it continues to be cited and drawn upon as recently as 2006
evidences its significance and influence in Indian nationalist historiography.
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CHAPTER TWO

A NARRATIVE OF THE 1931 KANPUR RIOTS

“The underlying and predisposing causes were of course:
1) The spirit of lawlessness engendered by the Civil Disobedience Movement;
2) The general ill-feeling and mistrust between the two communities which
followed on the Civil Disobedience Movement (just as they followed on the Non
cooperation Movement of 1921…”130
District Magistrate J.F Sale in his testimony to the
Official Commission of Enquiry
Introduction
To date, no published secondary narrative of the Kanpur Riots exists. Despite the
numerous references to Part II of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, an account of HinduMuslim relations from the medieval era to the 1930s, the actual events of the riot have held little
import to historians. In his work, Communalism in North India, Gyan Pandey used the authors of
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report’s reinterpretation of history as evidence for his argument
on communalism without delving into the context in which it was written. Sumit Sarkar, in his
magisterial survey of Modern India, discussed the Kanpur Riots in a different way though still
subsuming the actual events of the disturbance. He described the riots as a part of a string of
religious riots that characterized Hindu-Muslim relations in the 1930s. In neither work are the
riot participants, citizens of Kanpur unaffiliated with either the British Government or the
Congress Party, the central focus.
This chapter will attempt to remedy this lack of focus by reconstructing a narrative of the
Kanpur Riots based on the British Commission Report, the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and
the private papers of British officials involved. Because the two Reports only overlap at certain
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points- particularly heinous atrocities committed and the death of Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi- this
narrative will focus on bridging points of disagreements, namely, the immediate cause of the riot
and the number of casualties in the aftermath. By themselves, the British Commission Report
and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report are not reliable sources. Displaying obvious biases,
each tends to promote its respective party-affiliated interests. The British seek to show the
Kanpur Riots as the natural outcome of a state of religious intolerance while the authors of the
Congress Report seek to show that the British are culpable for perpetuating the riots. In what
follows, Part I will describe the city of Kanpur, its population and economy, Part II will delve
into the causes of the riots and Part III will chart the course of the Riots from their onset to their
close. The goal of this chapter is to provide a context to understand the Kanpur Riots as it was
documented by the respective authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the British
Commission Report, and the British officials involved.
Part I: A Profile of Kanpur
Geography
The city of Kanpur is located in as the state of Uttar Pradesh, known under colonial rule
as the United Provinces.131 Situated in north India, Kanpur rests on the west bank of the Ganges
River, approximately 120 miles from Allahabad and 42 miles from Lucknow.132 The city is
shaped like an “irregular quadrilateral” with its shape defined by four right-handed angles to the
north, east, west and south.133 Bordered by the Ganges River to the north and a major
thoroughfare, Mall Road, to the east, the city proper of Kanpur is clearly defined. Two roads, the
Meston Road, running north to south and Halsey Road stretching from the northwest corner of
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the city to the southeast corner crisscross the city proper. Their intersection in the central portion
of the city is called Moulganj.134 Because most of the rioting occurred within the bounds of the
city proper, a detailed understanding of the topography of Kanpur is needed. The following
description begins at the central portion of the city and makes a clockwise survey of the city,
covering all the important points of conflict as pertaining to the riot.135
Slightly north of Moulganj on Meston Road is Teli’s temple and to the immediate west is
the Macchli Bazzar Mosque. To the east of Teli’s Temple is Colonelganj, located half a mile
away from the Civil Lines and Police Lines. Directionally, the Colonelganj is set a half a mile
southeast of Gwaltoli, an outlying area near the Civil Lines. Directly south of Colonelganj is “the
main populated area of the city consisting of an “oblong block running east to west and about a
mile and a half deep.”136 South of this area is the Kotwali (police station) and the Collectorganj
in the southeast corner of the city. Traversing the southern border from the Kotwali is the
Muncipal Office and further west in the southeast corner is Anwarganj. To the north, following
the perimeter of the western side of the quadrilateral is a narrow road whose southern portion is
called Thathrai and whose northern portion is named Chauk Sarrafa.137 Next to the Chauk
Sarrafa is the Chauk Sarrafa Mosque. Crossing Mall Road, southwest of the aforementioned
mosque is the Chauk Bazaza, a narrow road, and within its proximity is the Chauk Bazaza
Mosque. It is here the riots began.
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Demography
As early as 1908, Kanpur had been regarded as an industrial and commercial center.
Situated within close proximity of the rail system, “it [had] an unequalled means of
communication with other parts of India.”138 Its rapid expansion and development saw the
creation of numerous mills and factories for which it became famous for in the early twentieth
century. In 1931, Kanpur’s mills employed over 20,000 people, approximately 10% of the total
number of residents.139 The population was largely transitory with the mills’ need for workers
determining the number of Kanpur’s inhabitants. Because the majority of Kanpur’s terrain was
unsuitable for cultivation, industrial workers vastly outnumbered agriculturists. H.R Nevill,
editor of the 1922 Gazetteer, stated that a “striking feature of the district is the proportion
compared to other areas of the United Provinces of waste and barren land.” 140 In 1922, 34.65%
of laborers were industrial workers compared to 17.35% who were employed as agriculturists.
This trend persisted in the 1930s with both the respective authors of the British Commission
Report and the Kanpur Riots Commission Report referring to the mills as a central feature of
Kanpur’s local economy.
In 1931, Kanpur’s population was 242,356 with Hindus comprising more than two-thirds
of the total number of people.141 Hindus generally lived to the northeast of Meston Road while
Muslims resided in the southwestern portion of the area outlying Meston Road. In every thana
(precinct), however, Hindus outnumbered Muslims.142 Both Reports concur that because Kanpur
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appealed to a migratory population who came to work in the city’s numerous mills, the criminal
element in the city was pervasive. In his testimony to the Official Commission of Enquiry, Joint
Magistrate Barron noted, “there [was] always a large floating population seeking work in the
mills, which forms a perfect screen for the activities of undesirables.”143 The Official
Commission of Enquiry was the committee drawn up by the local British government in Kanpur
to determine the causes and course of the riot.144 Statistics from the 1931 Gazetteer evidence the
increasing rate of crime in the Kanpur district. Between 1922 and 1931, the “number of cases
investigated by police” jumped from 3,404 to 5,643 per annum.145 The number of persons
convicted on account of robbery or delinquency more than doubled from 30 in 1922 to 78 in
1931. Though some crimes such as “bad livelihood” or “criminal trespass” decreased over the
nine years, overall, crime had become a serious problem in Kanpur according to the Congress
Commission and the authors of the British Report. The situation had drastically changed from
when H.R Nevill, compiling the 1922 Gazeteer, wrote “…it may be considered from the police
point of view [that Kanpur] is one of the least troublesome of the large cities in the provinces.”146
Kanpur had become a home to numerous goonda (gangster) organizations and a major drug
trafficking center in North India.
Local British Government
The local Kanpur government was a part of the Allahabad division. The bureaucratic
system consisted of a commissioner under whose jurisdiction were the magistrate and collector.
Provinces. Evidence for this conclusion comes from the fact that the publication information indicates it was printed
by the Superintendent of Printing and Stationary in the United Provinces.
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The magistrate and collector were in charge of what would now be considered mayorial tasks.
They were responsible for the maintenance of “a covenanted assistant, three deputy collectors,
and a treasury officer.”147 The District Magistrate in Kanpur was J.F. Sale. Beneath him were the
Joint Magistrate, Barron and two Deputy Magistrates, Rameshwar Dayal and Islam Nabi Khan.
Also under his jurisdiction was the police department, headed by Superintendent of Police, R. M.
Rogers, and his Deputy Superintendent of Police, Khan Bahadur Saiyid Ghulam Hasnnain. 148
Kanpur had three police stations, one located in the southeastern corner of the city at the
Kotwali, one located directly opposite in the southwestern corner in Anwarganj and the third
located to the northeast near Colonelganj.
The number of police forces in Kanpur differed from the official account and the number
actually patrolling in the streets of the city. On paper, the armed police consisted of 4 SubInspectors, 32 Head Constables, 53 Naiks (corporals) and 500 Constables.149 In reality, on March
24th, the first day of the riots, the “actual strength” was 4 Sub-Inspectors, 11 Head Constables, 19
Naiks and 50 Constables.150 These figures, while approximately equal to Sales’ calculation of the
number of troops in Kanpur, did not exactly correspond to his exact figures. Testifying in front
of the Official Commission of Enquiry, Sale claimed that on the first day of the riots, “the
following police were on duty in the city thana and on Mall Road, viz., 9 sub-inspectors, 39 NCS
and 242 constables, while the following were present in the Police Lines ready for duty viz. 3
sub-inspectors, 18 NCS and 66 constables of Armed Police, 2 NCSs and 50 Constables of Civil
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Police; and 2 NCS and 28 Constables of Mounted Police.151 The number of available officials
fell short of the official count and the authors of the British Commission Report cite these
statistics as a significant reason for the spread of rioting.
It was these government officials and officers who held the responsibility of restoring
order to the city and, when they failed to do so, were censured by the Kanpur Riots Commission
Report and to a certain extent, by the British Commission Report.
Part II: Foreshadowing the Riot
The riots of 1931 were not an extraordinary occurrence. Since the beginning of the
twentieth century, Hindu-Muslim relations had been deteriorating. Although the authors of the
Kanpur Riots Commission Report maintained that 1922 was the pivotal year when relations
soured, communal incidents preceding that date had given rise to feelings of religious
bitterness.152 A paramount factor in this increasing gulf between Hindus and Muslims was the
rise of the Nationalist Movement in Kanpur.
In the early twentieth century, as a major industrial city, Kanpur was attuned to the
goings-on of the national political scene. Though the respective authors of both the British
Commission Report and the Kanpur Riot Commission Report maintained that business interests
were a higher priority than political affiliations to the city’s residents, each Report noted the
growing politicization of Kanpur. The British Commission Report documented the fact that “Mr.
Gandhi’s movement… [has] attracted itself, for various reasons, the active support of more
businessmen than has been the case with previous political movements in India.”153 The attention
the Nationalist Movement was garnering affected both Hindus and Muslims, albeit in different
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ways. Testifying in front of the Commission of Enquiry, Barron commented, “there can be no
doubt that the Civil Disobedience Movement of the Congress Party ---- so has embittered
communal relations. Mohemmedans being the numerical minority feel that they must have very
definite safeguards for their own interests before Swaraj (political independence) is obtained. As
Congress is a body almost entirely Hindu [and] has always been.154 When the Movement was
called off by Mahatma Gandhi in 1922, “Kanpur…acted like the rest of India” with the former
members of the Non-Cooperation Movement joining religious- what the Kanpur Riots
Commission Report terms “communal,”- organizations.155 Fiery religious rhetoric could be heard
in Muslim shops and religious festivals that had once been celebrated by both communities now
began to be exclusively Hindu or Muslim. “Muslim boys were lectured not to buy Kheel or
Batass at Diwali, and Hindu boys were asked not to buy or play with crackers at the Shab
Barat.”156 This environment of religious exclusion gradually worsened during the 1920s,
escalating in 1927 with Kanpur’s first ever religious riot.
Though the riot was quickly settled, its occurrence highlighted a major rift between
Hindus and Muslims in Kanpur. While the British Commission Report is inaccurate in claiming,
“the Muslims from the first had refused to join the [National] movement,” by 1927 it was clear
that the number of Muslims within the Congress Committee was steadily declining.157 Reasons
cited by both Reports were perceptions that the Congress Party had become a Hindu platform,
Muslim interests were being ignored, and separate electorates were necessary to ensure equal
representation. Though national overtures were made to persuade Muslims to join Congress and
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some Muslims did join, overall, the efforts were not successful.158 The resumption of the
Nationalist Movement in 1930 did little to alleviate religious tensions, instead exacerbating the
problem with the increased implementation of hartals, pickets of stores intended to disrupt the
local economy.
By 1930, hartals had become a mainstay of the Congress Party and both the British and
Kanpur Riots Commission Reports devote significant time to explaining how the picketing
angered Muslim shopkeepers who had chosen not to join the Movement. Barron remarked,
“frequent hartals, proclaimed and enforced by Congress, and picketing of shops which dealt in
goods of which Congress disapproved, inflicted pecuniary loss and hardship on all
concerned.”159 Although hartals were supposed to be peaceful, overzealous Congress volunteers
would “openly and deliberately…permit obstruction [of shops] by lying down before shops, etc.
by forming cordons or standing close together and thus obstructing the passage.”160 Congress
workers, as acknowledged by both Reports, forced shop closures and in response, the GovernorGeneral issued an ordinance in the May of 1930 declaring, “when resort is made to such methods
it becomes necessary for Government to protect the freedom of action of those who may wish to
sell and those who may wish to buy.”161 Going hand in hand with forced shop closures was the
practice of disrupting vehicular traffic and forcing occupants to travel on foot. Though the origin
of the practice remains in dispute, with both Hindus and Muslims claiming the other side
initiated the custom, its harmful effects were apparent.
It was during this atmosphere of religious tension that the Tanzim Movement arose.
Barron recalled that the “Tanzim Movement sprang up in response to the successes of the
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Congress party. It was primarily and outwardly religious but rapidly developed local political
tendencies.”162 Ostensibly created for the purpose of reminding and ensuring Muslims performed
their daily five Namaz, the Movement became progressively more militant and expanded to
include the majority of Muslim residents in Kanpur.163 The activities of its followers comprised
of armed processions in Kanpur and until January 16, 1931 when the Government banned the
carrying of weapons, frequently included “ballams (spears), Kauralis (daggers), Khantas (axes)
and even, drawn swords.”164 Anti-Hindu songs were sung by processors and accounts from both
the Congress and British Reports describe how the movement was a Muslim reaction to what
Muslims saw as a growing disparity between the two communities. A witness describing the
Tanzim Movement to the authors of the Kanpur Riots Commission Report stated, “the unifying
force of [Tanzim] was the fear which pervaded the Muslim community that the Hindu
community wished to trample all the sentiments and the interests of the Musalmans.”165 The
Tanzim movement introduced militancy in Muslim calls for recognition of their separate
interests and both Reports recognized the movement as a contributing factor in the outbreak of
the 1931 Kanpur Riots.
By March of 1931, Hindus and Muslims had diverged politically and economically. The
National Civil Disobedience Movement had caused the initial fracture and subsequent religious
developments ensured that both religious groups would see their interests as conflicting rather than
as collaborative. In the span of eight years, from 1922-1930, when the Nationalist Movement was
inactive, religious organizations proliferated to the extent that they divided Hindus and Muslims
into two camps. The Congress Movement came to be regarded as a Hindu party, advancing
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exclusively Hindu interests while the Tanzim Movement gained ground as a platform for Muslims.
Though speculations in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report maintained that the British
Government orchestrated the voracity of the Tanzim Movement, their own admittance that “no
legal proof exists” makes it very difficult to substantiate their claims.166 A reading of the two
accounts makes clear that numerous incidents, teasing out political and economic pressure points,
had worsened the situation.
Baghat Singh’s execution, according to both sources, was “the spark that was needed” to
set off the riot. 167 Similar to the Tanzim Movement, both Reports find it necessary to recount the
illustrious, if short-lived, career of Baghat Singh and his subsequent hanging. Baghat Singh was
a young revolutionary who had risen to fame at the age of 21 after killing J.P. Saunders, a
Deputy Superintendent for Police. One year later, he and a fellow revolutionary, Batukeshwar
Dutt, threw a bomb into the National Assembly as a form of protest against the Defence of India
Act, which was currently being debated on the floor. Shortly after detonating the bomb, Singh
and Dutt turned themselves in. Though it was proven that the bomb was not intended to kill
anyone (Singh and Dutt threw it away from the legislators), nor did it, both were tried and
convicted. Another revolutionary, Shivaram Rajguru, was also arrested in the aftermath of the
bombing after his participation in Saunders’ death was discovered. During his jail term, Baghat
Singh along with his co-conspirators, “by various devices-hunger striking was only one of
them…succeeded in bringing the usual procedure of law to a standstill.”168 Baghat Singh became
a national hero and as efforts to secure his clemency failed, he became an inspiration for young
revolutionaries. “His execution excited strong feelings among parties covering a wide range of
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political thought” and though not to the extent the British Report claims, the Muslims did to a
lesser degree “stand aloof.”169
In Kanpur, the day after the execution became known, hurried preparations were put in
place for a hartal (boycott) to commemorate Baghat Singh’s execution in a nationwide
campaign. Because British officials believed that the hartal “might be considered to be rather of
the nature of pleas for mercy than of defiance,” in District Magistrate Sale’s words, they “were
informed [by telephone] that they might permit the procession.”170 The Congress Party in Kanpur
had “chalked out a programme for the observance of Bhagat Singh Day” which included a
citywide “hartal, bare-footed and bare-headed, silent procession, [and a] meeting in the
evening.”171 Although Congress leaders headed preparations to inform shopkeepers, “boys and
young men would see that a hartal in honour of their own hero, Bhagat Singh, would be a strict
and complete.”172 The strict enforcement of the hartal gave way to increasing resentment of
Muslim shopkeepers and small clashes erupted across the city the morning of March 24th as
occupants of vehicles were forced to dismount. Sale recounted, “during the course of the
morning there was considerable amount of rowdyism in the city by the promoters of the Hartal.
They stopped the trams by blocking the lines with paving stones; people passing in ekkas (small
vehicles) and tongas (rickshaws) were ----persuaded to get down. Stones were thrown at the
Kotwali (police station) and at the Europeans passing in cars.”173 Both the British Report and the
Kanpur Riots Commission Report reference the same two occurrences that occurred early that
morning; the first, involving a Muslim woman who was forced to alight from her tonga and the
second, an English woman who was compelled to get down from her car. Congressmen
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countered the threat of violence by walking around the city and quelling minor tiffs. Thus, the
morning, while seeing minor clashes break out, remained under control and authors of both
Reports note how the turn toward communal violence only happened later.
Until this point, the British Commission Report and Kanpur Riots Commission Report
are largely in agreement. The predisposing causes cited by both sets of authors concur and
though the emphasis differs in which causes were more influential than others, the two accounts
do not directly contradict each other. The afternoon of the 24th marked a change in both Reports.
What the Kanpur Riots Commission Report accepted as “universal fact,” the authors of the
British Report “have no hesitance in rejecting.”174 That the course of the riot differs in each
account can be explained by the fact the narratives were intended to fulfill two conflicting
political goals. In telling the story of the riots, both sides hoped to mitigate the blame on their
side and charge the other side with more responsibility for the bloodshed.
Part III: A Daily Narrative
March 24th
By noon on March 24th, the small skirmishes that had led to prominent members of the
Congress Party traversing Kanpur on foot and quelling the small clashes had evolved into larger
acts of violence. Gangs of young men shattered shop windows and threatened shopkeepers with
further acts of vandalism if the shops remained open. “In Meston Road [one of the major roads
of the city] the interference with Muslim shop-keepers continued, and at about 1:30 pm, it is said
that Hindus had started throwing brickbats at a Muslim shop.”175 As both accounts noted,
however, the violence had not turned communal. It would take two events, both unsubstantiated
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by outside sources and rejected by the authors of the British Commission Report, to turn the
violence into a religious riot.
Although the two incidents are uncorroborated by other sources, their inclusion in this
narrative is justified because it is a lack of evidence and not counterevidence that makes their
claims weak. The first incident was recounted by three sets of witnesses. Though there is some
variation in the anecdotes, at its core, the three statements can be simplified into the fact that
exclamations of Hindu-Muslim strife preempted any such violence. According to witnesses in
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report, “At about 12 o’clock,” three tongas each carrying two
passengers passed by with the occupants “crying all the way with their hands outstretched
‘Hindus and Musalmans have begun fighting!”176 The tongas were riding through the city with
the occupants making the same exclamatory announcement. Another witness reported, “several
people simultaneously proclaimed in various parts of the city that Hindus were assaulting
Muslims and vice versa.”177 A third set of witnesses maintained that a policeman had instigated
the violence by beating a “Hindu passer-by and to shout that the Hindus were murdering the
Muslims on all sides…”178 Though not enough evidence exists to confirm any of these cases,
what can be taken away is the common denominator that early in the afternoon, violence was
provoked by shouts that sectarian violence were occurring even though circumstances up to that
point had given no indication of religious strife.
The second incident occurred shortly after and involved a Committee of Imperial
Defence (C.I.D) agent who had affronted the crowd gathered by the Badshani Naka.179 The
curious episode was explained by numerous witnesses who maintained:
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That this man deliberately provoked the crowd. He first passed through them carrying a
bicycle on hand, and then having gone a few hundred feet, rode back and tried to pass
through that same crowd. Not being permitted to do so, he tried the ekk (a small
footpath), and after a final scuffle ran through the Moolganj crossing chased by the
younger elements of the crowd.180
In what ensued, Muslims claimed the man had been Muslim and had been “beaten by Hindus,
and so the Muslims at that place beat them in return.”181 The authors of the Congress
Commission Report maintained that it was this confrontation that “is universally believed to
have given a communal turn to the affair and started the rioting.”182 What is prevalent in the
Congress explanation of the riots are various conspiracy theories involving the C.I.D, British
Secret Service, involvement. For obvious reasons, not the least the lack of evidence highlighting
Indian voices, their claims difficult to prove. For the purpose of this narrative, it will suffice to
say that British involvement remains suspect but unproven.
By 1 p.m., the riots had broken out in full force. Sale recounted that: “at about 1 p.m. a
crowd of students and youths of the Vanar Sena suddenly rushed along the Mall breaking
windows of Government offices, such as the Telegraph Office and of a good many commercial
firms and shops eg. Mesaro Valerios and Sons, Confectioners, Hope Bros. Outfitters, the
imperial Chemical Industries Ltd.”183 A witness cited in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report,
Rai Sahib Rup Chand Jain, a banker and an Honorary Magistrate, corroborated Sale’s testimony.
Declaring “a large number of rowdy Muslims were seen scattered on Halsey and Moolganj roads
armed with lathis (clubs), ballams (spears), khantas (axes), etc.,” Jain confirmed Sale’s account
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of violence in the city proper.184 Mounted police dispatched to quell the violence at 3 p.m. were
unsuccessful when “they failed to catch anyone” according to Sale’s testimony.185
At Moolganj Crossing, in the center of the city, two groups of Hindus and Muslims,
numbering 100-200, were throwing stones at one another. As reported to a Congressman, the
immediate cause of the clash was a reaction to news that Hindus had been attacking Muslims at
Badshahi Nak.186 British policemen headed by the Kotwal, Khan Bahadur Syed Ghulam
Hasnain, emerged on the scene to restore calm. Hearing that G.G Jog, a prominent Congressman,
had been killed, the Kotwal went to investigate, delegating the task of restoring peace to the
“Station Officer, Kotwali, and the armed guard.”187 He found that Jog had only a slight injury
and meeting Ganesh Vidyarthi on his way back to Moolganj Crossing, he enlisted the latter to
publicize the fact that Sri Jog had only been injured. The Kotwali set about dispersing the crowd
at the crossing and then proceeded to Shera Babu’s Park where he found a number of Muslims
wrecking religious emblems of different faiths that had decorated the park. By this point, around
4 p.m., numerous clashes had broken out across the city. The Ban Bazaar Mosque had been
partially destroyed by Hindus and at Badshahi Nak, fighting had restarted. Rioters had set the
Chauk Bazaza Mosque on fire and in Saraffa, agitators looted shops. In his testimony, Joint
Magistrate Barron Reported, “the telephone bell rang constantly [at the District Magistrate’s
residence] and I received many messages from excited people begging for assistance as there
was great disturbance in the city.”188 District Magistrate, J.F Sale, had been summoned. But in a
brief conference at Shera Babu’s house, “it was decided that the police could still deal with the
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situation without military aid.”189 In making his decision, Sale ignored the advice of Rameshwar
Dayal, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, who was present at the meeting. According to his
own testimony, Sale had already dispatched troops to the Queen’s Park at 3 p.m.190 Barron
supported Sale’s claims of addressing the violence by citing that “at about 5:50 pm. At Moolganj
there was a Police picket of about 20 or 25 men.”191 Yet, these measures were insufficient to
quell the citywide rioting that was consuming the city.
Personal anecdotes from the Kanpur Riots Commission Report evidence the growing
hysteria affecting Kanpur. Sale remarked that throughout the course of the day, “various parties
of Hindus and Mohemmedans came up in rather an excited manner complaining of each others
attacks and they were assured that every possible protection would be given, if they kept
quiet.”192 Despite his assurances, rioters set the Meston Road temple on fire. Sale sent two
magistrates, Anand Swarup and Gauri Prasad, to help the police and fire brigade to douse the
flames. Swarup arrested two looters and in doing so observed that the Misri Bazaar, located in
close proximity, was being looted.193 He “stopped the men from looting and drove them
away.”194 Swarup then phoned Sale, informing him the situation was rapidly getting out of hand
and reinforcements would be necessary. Supporting Swarup’s calls for extra help was the looting
of the Etawah Bazaar that evening around 7 p.m. The police company, responding to Swarup’s
calls, sent a force of “two officers and 66 British other ranks…to Meston Road.”195 The situation
worsened from the late afternoon through the evening when Sale decided to call for additional
military reinforcements at 8 p.m. Through the night, as military reinforcements consisting of the
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second company of Highland Light Infantry arrived on Meston Road, acts of arson and pillaging
continued to wreak havoc upon the city
March 25th
Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi, described in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report as “the
only person who even in this crisis could command some moral authority and exercise some
restraining influence,” sought to single-handedly end the riots and his endeavors form the bulk of
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report’s narrative of the events of March 25th.196 A letter
reprinted in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report and later in the The Leader, a newspaper
based in Allahabad, captured many of the sentiments and events of the 25th. Writing to a close
friend who had offered her services to help quell the riots, Vidyarthi responded, “at present I
cannot ask you to come out….The police stands by watching unconcerned while mosques and
temples are burnt, people are beaten and shops are looted.”197 Police inaction was a common
thread in the different narratives that comprised the Kanpur Riots Commission Report’s retelling
of the riots and Vidyarthi’s letter serves as verifiable proof of British culpability during the days
of the riot.
Returning to Kanpur, throughout the morning, violence escalated as arson and fighting
spread to outlying areas of Kanpur . “By 6 a.m., Mr. Seward found arson and fighting in progress
in Sabzimandi, Coolie Bazaar, and Cooperganj, and between 8 and 9 a.m, fighting was going on
to the south of Sisamau, an area outlying the city proper.”198 Sale reported that “just about then
[9 a.m.] alarms from outlying mohallas (neighborhoods) began to be received and parties were at
once sent out from Meston Road as on the previous day.”199 Yet, the number of complaints
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revolving around police inaction continued to increase and the authors of the Kanpur Riots
Commission Report noted that “almost every witness who came before us had seen instances in
which murder, loot and arson had been committed in the presence of policemen who had refused
to take any notice of them.”200 Etawah Bazaar also became a site of rioting when a “huge gang
…burnt several shops [and] killed several Musalmans.”201 Vidyarthi hastened to quell the
violence and recruited Shri Kanhaya Lal to use his lorry as a taxi service for transporting injured
persons to the hospital. In a meeting held in the Congress Office the day before, rescue work had
been designated the Congress Party’s recourse to dealing with the riots. Vidyarthi continued to
“the Muslim lane near Girdhar Das’ house” where a number of Hindus were hiding.202
Accompanying him were Hindu and Muslim volunteers who successfully deflected attacks upon
Ganeshji by informing his would-be assailants that “Ganeshji had already rescued thirty or
thirty-five Musalmans.”203 Dispatching the thirty Hindus who had been hiding with Lal,
Vidyarthi proceeded to the Bengali Mohal where both the authors of the British and Kanpur
Riots Commission Reports asserted that rioters “perpetuated the most horrible atrocities.”204
In one instance described by both accounts, a gang of Hindus, after setting a house on
fire, searched for any surviving occupants, dragging them out to butcher them “before the very
eyes of the witness and her daughter-in-law and child, who were the sole survivors thanks to
their feigning death by throwing themselves on the heap of corpses. Even so they did not escape
injury…as the assailants set fire” to the pile of bodies.205 The authors of the British Report noted
Vidyarthi’s efforts to stop the violence; “Mr. Vidyarthi reached this mohalla and successfully
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assisted in the rescue of a number of other Muslim families in the vicinity.”206 As the fervor of
the violence continued to increase, Vidyarthi continued to “engage in rescue work” according to
both the British and Kanpur Riots Commission Reports until his death at the hands of a Muslim
mob. 207
Vidyarthi, after leaving the Bengali Mohalla, had hastened to Karin ki Chakki, a side
street in the city proper. There after seeing the successful rescue of a Hindu family, Vidyarthi
came between two hostile and armed Muslim mobs. A witness with Vidyarthi narrated: “one of
the Musalmans there whom I recognize cried out:
This is Ganesh Shankar Vidyarthi. Let us kill him, let him not escape… Some
Musalmans then ran towards Ganeshji. Ganesji bent his head before them, and said
something I could not hear. A man stabbed him in the back. Another attacked him with a
khanta. Ganeshji fell down.208
Rumors of his death spurred other Congress Party leaders to search for him and the authors of
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report documented the efforts of Iqbal Krishna Kapoor and Jog to
find his body that afternoon. In the midst of this tragedy, rioters continued to devastate the city
and clashes broke out in Gwaltoli, Sadar Bazaar, Shutarkhana, Parmat, and Baconganj, different
areas of Kanpur.
The British response was to post military pickets and dispatch patrols. A picket was
placed at Kunji Lal’s temple and “two military parties were patrolling all day on either side of
Meston Road.”209 The number of military personnel increased in the afternoon as an Auxillary
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Force was deployed to Mall Road to avoid the violence from spreading to the Civil Lines. Other
reinforcements arrived later that afternoon, and by 4:30 the existing pickets were strengthened
and new pickets set up throughout the city. The effect on the rioters, however, of this increased
martial force was limited. S. Bhasin, Secretary of the United Provinces Kerana Seva Samiti, a
Hindu organization, reported that, “houses were being looted in the very presence of the police in
Bengali Mohal as well as Butcherkhanna…at about 4:30 p.m., I told these constables to arrest the
robbers but they pleaded want of orders. I told them that these were cognizable offences and no
order was necessary, but to no effect.”210 Describing his own actions during the riot, Sale
maintained in his testimony:
I received a number of appeals for aid by letters and telephone. I kept as close liaison as
possible by telephone and I believe that every possible effort was made to give help to
private applicants but in view of the widespread nature of the trouble and the scanty
forces at our disposal it was not possible to satisfy every applicant.”211
Barron also commented on the numerous calls for help:
During the whole day rumors or reports were coming in from different quarters of the
city of rioting, looting and arson. If first they were accepted at their face value and parties
of police were dispatched by lorry to more distant parts or on foot to the nearer ones…the
parties returned to report that the rumors were entirely unfounded and that all was quiet
in the locality in which they had been sent.212

That evening saw Barron patrol the city and describe an area that had allegedly been the scene
of rioting as a deserted street where “we could see no signs of burning houses or of rioting… all
was perfectly quiet. No shouting could be heard.”213 Sale refused to institute Martial Law yet
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“on the morning of the 26th riots were still continuing in full force, especially in the more
outlying areas” according to the British Report.214
March 26th
The 26th proved to be just as calamitous as the 25th. 215 During the early morning,
Sisamau, an area outlying the city proper, once more came under attack by both Muslims and
Hindus. By 8 a.m., Gwaltoli Bazar was in flames and rioters renewed attacks on Parmat. Around
9 a.m., the Annapura temple at Patkapur was demolished by a fire, a number of houses
destroyed, and the Juma Mosque damaged.216 Baconganj and Colonelganj remained beleaguered
and the looting of shops, destruction of homes, and murders continued throughout the city.
Despite the arrival of higher police officials from Lucknow, the situation remained dire. Sale
commented, “around 10 a.m., a large number of alarm reports continued to be received during
the day both by me, the Superintendent of Police and the Office Commanding Station, many of
them were on enquiry found to be false.”217 Yet, as the authors of the British Report noted, at
times, Sale was too quick to dismiss claims of rioting as baseless. The case of Mr. S.M Basheer,
Barrister-at-Law, exemplified this oversight:
Early on the 26th, Mr. Basheer went to the District Magistrate and then to the
Superintendent of Police and to the Kotwal for help but unluckily his request fell on deaf
ears as owing to the previous reports of all being quiet in Parmat [Barron, the Deputy
Inspector-General of Police and Superintendent of Police had patrolled the main bazaar in
Parmat and had “found all quiet”] thus no reliance was placed on his statement. By
midday on the 26th, about 19 Muslims had been murdered and a number of houses looted
and burnt.218
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Attacks continued in the city proper and outlying areas. Renewed attacks on Sabzimandi from
the previous day resulted in “a number of murders…committed and several persons severely
injured.”219In Sadar Bazzar, fighting had resumed and “looting was in progress in Lathi
Mohal.”220 In his testimony, Sale described how:
Rescue parties were organized under the charge of magistrates or police officers and a
good many people were taken out from houses and hiding places where they had been
since the riots began. Only then was it fully realized that a ghastly set of murders had
occurred of people of both communities who were living in groups or singly in the
middle of people of the other community.221
Rescue efforts comprised of implementing more pickets, dividing the city into two circles with a
Deputy Superintendent of Police patrolling each area and assuming responsibility for the
“supervision of police arrangements.”222 That evening, Barron reported around 5 p.m., “the
situation appeared much easier. A good number of men were moving about in a moral manner
and a few shops had opened in the main streets.”223
March 27th–30th
As noted by the British Report, March 27th saw “marked signs of improvement.”224 The
number of areas under attack diminished and rescue workers were largely unmolested as they
traversed the city, aiding the wounded and preparing bodies for funerary arrangements. Solitary
acts of violence, however, continued to affect parts of the city. In an attempt to depict how grisly
the violence had been, the authors of the Kanpur Riots Commission Report included three
tragedies to “illustrate the horrors that were raging.”225 The second of their documented tragedies
occurred on March 27th. Pandit Kanhaiya Lal of Phoolganj recounted how his Muslim neighbors
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tortured his relative, Batashi, by cutting off the flesh of her heels to take her silver anklets,
“weighing 120 tolas.”226 After throwing her in a well, the rioters murdered the narrator’s wife
and assaulted him and his father with until they became unconscious. Crimes like these
continued and the authors of the British Report support these claims though maintaining that the
frequency and number of such crimes diminished.
On March 28th, “the situation continued to show a definite improvement with only a few
murders being reported.”227 The authors of both the Congress and British Report recognized the
efforts of Kirana Seva Samiti, a Hindu organization, as contributing to the restoration of peace.
According to a report cited in the Kanpur Riots Commission Report, the “Kirana Sewa Samiti
between the 24th and 29th of March sent 102 dead bodies to the Prince of Wales Hospital, burnt
60 on the spot under orders of the authorities, sent 140 wounded men, women and children to the
Prince of Wales Hospital, and rescued 187 families and 86 persons from affected areas.”228 The
efforts of the Congress Party coupled with official endeavors served to end much of the violence.
By this point, however, Kanpur had been devastated. “Whole mohallas (neighborhoods) lay
desolate with debris of burn and smouldering houses interspersed….Inside the houses, in the
lanes, and on public roads, lay dead bodies of human beings in advance stages of
decomposition.”229 It was against this backdrop that volunteers and officials assisted victims and
evaluated the wreckage. Neighborhoods that had previously been comprised of both Muslim and
Hindu populations “had practically ceased to exist for the time being” and “whole masses of
population had shifted their quarters.”230 By one estimate, 80,000 people had fled by railway
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alone in the opening days of the riot.231 Yet, shops began to open and both the Congress and
British Report maintain that Kanpur began to return to normalcy.
The 29th and 30th saw further improvements. The arrangements on the 29th for two
Deputy Magistrates, one Muslim and the other Hindu, to go around in designated areas of the
city was a measure noted by both Reports as very successful since it resulted in the “cessation of
the constant shouting at night which had tended to keep up a state of panic.”232 British officials
removed the military pickets and mills began to resume normal hours of operation. Reporting to
the British Commission, however, Hoon, a British lawyer, dampened the impact of official
action to end the riots by commenting, “I am convinced that if the combatants had not exhausted
themselves by fighting, the results would have been even more disastrous.”233 Though solitary
acts of violence continued to affect some parts of the city, by the 30th, calm had been restored. It
is here where the British Report maintains a daily log of events is unnecessary because “the
situation had been brought fully under control.”234
The Aftermath
The Kanpur Riots had resulted in major loss of life and property damage. By the end of
the riot, the official estimate of the number of casualties was 294, 155 Hindu victims and 119
Muslims.235 However, as N. Gerald Barrier notes in his introduction to Roots of Communal
Politics, the casualty count was much higher, approximately 400, and the authors of the British
Report concede that figures may have been higher than the official count. The number wounded
similarly was underestimated in the British Report. Compared to Barrier’s estimate of 1200 the
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authors of the British Report only counted 401 injured persons throughout the week-long riot.236
In addition to the human loss was the complete devastation of the city. According to official
estimates, eighteen mosques, forty-two temples, 248 Hindu houses and 101 Muslim houses were
burnt or damaged. 237 In a statement “showing crimes reported mohalla-wise (neighborhoodwise)…for the first four days of the riot, over 1,500 crimes were reported in the 28 mohallas.”238
While the number of crimes per mohalla ranged from less than ten per day in some mohallas to
over a hundred per day in other mohallas, the number of arrests made in each neighborhood was
proportionally much less. Hundreds of crimes were reported yet the most arrests made in any
single day was 66 on the 23rd in the Colonelganj mohalla.239 The discrepancy between criminal
action and police action drew “search-lights from all over India…falling upon Kanpur and
scrutinizing in a most uncomfortable way the doings of the local officials and the Government
policy.”240 Police inaction became the watchword for the Congress Party and confronting the
legitimacy of the British government to safeguard the interests of Kanpur citizens, the authors of
the Kanpur Riots Commission Report called upon riot victims to question its authority.
Conclusion
In their daily log of the events of the riots, both the respective authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report and the British Commission Report used personal anecdotes to describe the
events of the riots. Yet, both subsumed the narratives of riot participants in their efforts to
promote their respective officials. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report followed
the leaders of the Congress Party in Kanpur as they attempted to quell the riots. The authors
reported their efforts in detail, calling attention to the individual contributions of each member.
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Similarly, the British Commission Report described the actions of British officials, focusing on
preventive measures taken by the District Magistrate and the collaborative efforts of the local
British Government in Kanpur and the military to put down the riots. In reading the narratives,
there is a sense of isolation among the people involved. The British Government officials were
caught up in the too-important business of rearranging troops and pickets to most effectively
quell the riots without personally being present. The policemen, jointly presented by the Kanpur
Riots Commission Report and the British Commission Report, as culpable for much of the
bloodshed because of their inaction, stand aside dispassionately watching atrocity after atrocity.
The result is a disjointed view both of how the riot took place and of the involvement of the riot
participants, the unstudied population in both accounts.
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CHAPTER THREE

IDENTIFYING THE VOICES OF RIOT PARTICIPANTS

“I am sure that is just when the riots began, those innumerable self-sacrificing
Congress volunteers who in Congress processions stood with their bended necks
ready to receive lathi blows from the police, faced the guns of white soldiers with
their chests uncovered, and who took pride in ending their lives by lying down before
the horses of mounted police, had taken their lives in their hands and began
Satyagraha in every mohalla against people who were busy fighting each other then
after the martyrdom of ten or twenty such volunteers the disturbance would have
ended.”241
Syed Aminuddin Haidar, witness to the Kanpur Riots242

Introduction
In his memorandum preceding the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, Bhagwan Das
explained that the Kanpur riots could be seen “as merely an aggravated symptom of the
disease.”243 Happening within weeks after the Benares and Agra riots, the Kanpur riots were
part of an increasingly violent trend of religious strife. Viewing the Kanpur riots within this
context, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report sought to show how the 1931
Kanpur riots were a typical example of Hindu-Muslim relations under the British Raj.
According to them, the British policy of “divide and rule,” was the major factor motivating
religious riots. To this effect, they presented the events of the Kanpur Riots as a continuation of
the 293-page history prefacing their account of the outbreak of violence. The Kanpur Riots, the
authors of the Congress Report argued could not be understood as an isolated incident but
instead needed to be documented as an example of Hindu-Muslim relations as written in the
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history included in the Report. Understanding the Kanpur Riots required understanding how
British rule in India was responsible for setting up the causes of conflict. The authors of the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report set out to prove that Hindu-Muslim strife was not built into
Hindu-Muslim relations but rather the result of official (British) manipulation.
The British Report was formally titled “Findings of the Committee appointed to hold a
departmental enquiry into the conduct of the subordinate police during the Kanpur riots.”
Written for the purpose of investigating claims of police inaction, the British Report was the
official statement of the British Government. It was intended for senior British officials to
evaluate the effectiveness of the official response to the riots and respond to the numerous
allegations of police inactivity by Kanpur’s citizens, both European and Indian. Though its
scope was more limited than the Congress Report, the authors of the British Report used the
Kanpur Riots to make a statement about Indians and British rule in India. The British authors
invoked riot participants, citizens of Kanpur unaffiliated with the Congress Party or the British
Government, to perpetuate two themes common to colonial historiography: that Hindu-Muslim
relations were primarily characterized by strife and that Indians as a whole were incapable of
governing themselves. Both private testimonies of British officials in Kanpur and the British
Commission Report refer to these facets when calling upon riot participants. These assumptions
are built into the text and their significance lies in the fact that they affect the way in which the
events of the Kanpur Riots are described.
In this chapter, I will examine the role of riot participants in both the Congress and
British Commission Reports. My objective is to show how the stories and voices of riot
observers became entangled with the ideological agendas of the nationalists in the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report and the colonialists in the British Commission Report. While the authors of
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the British Report used witness testimonies to a lesser extent than the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report, both incorporated riot participants to make a political statement. The
British, in private testimonies in addition to the British Commission Report, called upon riot
participants to legitimize the necessity for British rule, while the Congress Party authors used the
voices of riot participants to show how the Congress Party functioned as a mouthpiece for the
public. In other words, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report saw their account of
the Kanpur riots as the public’s story. Their role was simplified to a conveyor of the public’s
truth. What they failed to consider, however, was how the public’s voice would undermine some
of their own claims. The voices included in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report had the
unintended effect of casting doubt on the Congress Party’s claims. The very words the authors of
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report used to show how they were the people’s representatives
helped substantiate claims that conflicted with the Congress Party’s agenda.
The British Portrayal of Riot Participants
The aftermath of the Kanpur riots saw not only the creation of a formal British
Commission Report but also the submission of official testimonies of British officials involved
in the riots. In a city where “extreme nervousness [continued to] exist on both the [Hindu and
Muslim] sides and may easily result in panic and a fresh outbreak,” British officials were called
upon to submit their personal accounts of the Kanpur riots.244 District Magistrate J.F Sale, Joint
District Magistrate Barron, and Superintendent Rogers documented the actions they had taken to
suppress the violence. The testimonies they produced became part of the official literature of the
Kanpur riots. They were incorporated into the British Commission Report and recounted in detail
in local newspapers such as The Leader and The Statesman. On April 21, 1931 the editors of The
Statesman printed an article entitled “Cawnpore Riots Inquiry: Magistrate’s Story; Why Martial
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Law was refused.” Two days later, they published extensive coverage of the “Official Inquiry
into Cawnpore Riots” documenting “charges against the police.”245 Coverage in The Leader was
more extensive. Beginning on April 2nd, the editors printed a series of articles detailing the
findings of the Official Cawnpore Riots Inquiry and quoting verbatim the testimonies of British
officials involved.246 Writing about the challenges they faced individually and the measures they
took, the three British officials sought to show how they had attempted to quell the riots to the
best of their capabilities at the time. What stands out, however, is their description of the rioters
and riot victims. This section will highlight colonial beliefs about Indians while documenting
how British officials viewed Indian citizens of Kanpur.
The British officials involved in the Kanpur riots and the authors of the British
Commission Report sought to show that the Hindu-Muslim strife was an enduring problem in
India. In the words of Joint Magistrate Barron, “friction between the two communities is
unfortunately an ever present problem in India.”247 Hindu-Muslim relations had worsened since
the 1920s and the authors of the British Commission Report illustrate one instance of this trend.
Quoting Mr. Chatterji, Principal of Christ Church College, Kanpur, they cite his experience as
representative of increased Hindu-Muslim tension. Chatterji recounted:
In my own College, which was made a target of virulent attacks, sometimes
accompanied by violence, the seventy or eighty Muslim students remain solidly loyal to
their institution, and most of them showed great pluck in attending College in the face of
obstruction and intimidation. On one occasion when the mob that…. accompanied the
Congress picketers assaulted students, the majority of those who received injuries

245

“Cawnpore Riots Inquiry: Magistrate’s Story; Why Martial Law was refused,” The Statesman, no. 18061, XCVII
(1931): 19; “Official Inquiry into Cawnpore Riots/Witnesses/ Charges Against the Police/Hooliganism Unchecked/
‘No Attempt to Deal with Outbreak’” The Statesman XCVII, no. 18063 (1931): 9.
246
Examples of articles include: “Cawnpore Riots and After Inaccurate Official Facts and Figures. Need for
Searching Public Inquiry,” The Leader LXXVIII, no. 6590 (1931): 10; “Cawnpore Settling Down/Response to
Congress Appeal/Deputation’s Statement/Allegations of Official Callousness,” The Leader LXXVIII, no. 6597
(1931): 10; “Cawnpore District Officer’s Disclaimer,” The Leader LXXVIII, no. 6599 (1931): 10.
247
Barron Testimony, 1931, 6.

74
happened to be Muslims. The incident roused much feeling among Muslims in the
town.248
Chatterji’s statement points to the Congress’ culpability in fueling religious tensions. His
comments are used as part of the explanation for the predisposing causes of the riots and they
can be used to view how British officials viewed ordinary citizens of Kanpur. The British held
ordinary citizens of Kanpur responsible, to a limited extent, for the outbreak of violence on
March 24th 1931 because some were involved in Congress activities.
The authors of the British Commission Report make the connection between the
Congress Party and the deterioration of Hindu-Muslim relations stronger in their next usage of a
riot observer’s remarks. While clarifying that the Congress Party is “discharged of any culpable
responsibility for the immediate outbreak,” they insinuate, through the words of an Indian citizen
of Kanpur, that the Congress Party may share some responsibility for the violence, if not
“culpable responsibility.249 They recount how “ Lala Dewan Chand, Principal of the Dayand
Anglo-Vedic College, told us that when he heard in Basti of the riot he returned at once to
Kanpur fearful that there might be trouble in Kanpur any day on account of “sympathetic
contagion.”250 Chand feared communal reprisal for violence occurring in nearby areas. Because
the Congress Party continued with their plan to hold a hartal, the British present the Congress
Party as out of touch with the concerns of some of Kanpur’s citizens. The authors of the British
Report maintain that Congress Party leaders should “have been aware of the tense feelings in
Kanpur as others were.251 This barb serves to undermine confidence in the competence of the
Congress Party and by extension the people they claim to represent, the citizens of Kanpur. The
authors of the British Commission Report further accentuate this point, contending, “it must have
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been present to the mind of the Committee that a hartal to the memory of Bhagat Singh would
particularly stir the imagination of their younger people and it was through the younger people
that hartals were accomplished, and if need be, enforced.”252 Lala Dewan’s words are used to
castigate the Congress Party and their volunteers without the British authors being completely
accountable for launching the attack.
In his testimony, Barron explicitly faults riot participants for the challenges they faced in
quelling the violence. Hindus and Muslims, as depicted, are not fit to govern themselves. Barron
portrays riot observers as a panic-stricken population who hinder official efforts to quell the
riots. In three instances, Barron makes reference to his supposition that “it appeared to be the
ambition of every resident of Kanpur to have an armed guard at his door step during the days of
the riot, irrespective of whether any rioting had taken place in the locality or not.”253 Barron
describes the citizens of Kanpur as interfering with official procedures without contributing to
efforts to quell the riots. The citizens of Kanpur are helpless and do not possess the know-how to
take charge of the situation. Responding to criticisms that he had been uncivil to riot victims,
Barron replied:
To all and sundry [who made requests for aid] I explained with great patience that we had
not sufficient men to deal with reports of actual rioting, so none could be spared for
rescue work in which there was no immediate danger or for protection from fear of
attack. To such as accepted this answer I was quite civil. To those who made a nuisance
of themselves by repeatedly asking for quite unnecessary help I had to speak brusquely in
order to get rid of them and get on with my work.254
The riot observers annoy Barron and frustrate his efforts on their behalf. His portrayal of the
people he deals with is unflattering and this impression is further compounded by the way he
describe what riot observes do during the riots.
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In Barron’s testimony, riot observers not only make incessant demands for help but they
make false statements. In his most detailed example of this type of event, Barron recalled:
“[On March 28th] After returning to the District Magistrate’s bungalow about 5 p.m. a
leading Kanpur business man arrived in a state of great panic and informed us that his
house was on fire and his women-folk were being murdered. I went with him to KallamKa Street and found all quiet and his house untouched. He called his servants and
demanded to be told where the rioters had gone. The servant asked, “what rioters?” On
being told “the man who set fire to the house” the servant merely looked bewildered and
replied “I do not know.” No one has been here since the riots started. The man who led
me on this errand had previously reported at least half a dozen times that his house was
in flames. He is B. Krishna Lal Gupta, who gave evidence before this commission, a few
days ago. I do not quote this as any reflections on Mr. Gupta.”255
Barron further explains that he “merely gives [this incident] as an instance of the type of
information which was being given to us at all hours of the day and night by telephone…or in
person.”256 What is notable about Barron’s account is that he recalls exactly what everyone said,
signified by his use of direct quotes, and his characterization of both the servant and B. Krishna
Gupta in stock terms. In other words, the servant and B. Krishna Gupta fulfill their roles: the
former as a “bewildered” bystander and the latter as an example of the panic-stricken population.
While this is the most thoroughly described individual example of riot observers purportedly
misrepresenting their situation, it is only one of three examples Barron cites. More characteristic
of how Barron presents the actions of riot observers is reflected in his description of an incident
that occurred on March 25th:
About 11:30 p.m., a telephone message was received that arson and rioting were in
progress at Parmat….Mr. Bell, Mr. Rogers, and I left by car. We stopped at the police
guard to follow us. We then went to Parmat and drove the whole way… We could see
no signs of burning houses or of rioting. The street was deserted and all was perfectly
quiet. No shouting could be heard. A patrol of U.P. Light Horne was just leaving the
locality when we arrived at the Police out post. They too had nothing to report… So we
concluded that this report was merely another false rumor and we left for the city.257
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Here, the riot observers are neither seen nor heard. They are an inconvenience that British
officials have to cope with. This view of riot participants is evidenced in Barron and Sale’s
testimony with the latter taking the characterization one step further by speculating what riot
participants would have done in certain conjectural situations.
Justifying their actions during the Kanpur riots, both Barron and Sale make assumptions
of what the reactions of riot participants would have been to hypothetical scenarios. Their
motive is to show how no matter what actions could have been taken during the riots, the
consequences would have been the same. Sale observes, “I think some of the persons who at the
time clamored for Martial Law would in a few days have begun to complain bitterly about
it.”258 The effect of Sale’s statement is to show how riot participants will have the same
complaints regardless of what official action is taken. In the same way that Sale purports to
predict the behavior of riot observers, Barron uses the same technique to ward off criticism. He
states, “it is alleged that for the first three or four days the authorities did absolutely nothing to
quell the riots. In reply to this I can only suggest that if the persons who have made these
allegations had found occasions to appear in the city during these four days they might have told
a very different story.”259 Though his construction is not as strong, “might have” compared to
Sale’s utterance of “would have,” the effect is the same. Barron suggests that under a
hypothetical set of circumstances, riot observers would have acted in a certain way, told a “very
different story.” While Barron’s remarks are not as disparaging as Sale’s, both purport to draw
conclusions on riot observers’ behavior based on their own biases. The portrayal of riot
observers that emerges is neither provable—Sale and Barron are conjecturing—nor contributory
to an understanding of the events of the riots.
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The final way Barron and Sale invoke riot observers is to show that they do not
understand the feasible ways of quelling a riot. Both the District Magistrate and the Joint
Magistrate blame riot observers for failing to grasp why certain measures would not help during
the course of the riot. Specifically, they address complaints of lack of firing by police and claims
of ineffective pickets. Throughout their testimonies, Barron and Sale maintain that very limited
opportunities existed to fire upon rioters and that pickets were indispensable in quelling the
violence. Barron recounted:
About 8:30 or 9 a.m. [on March 25th], a report was received that crowds were gathering
on both sides of the Moulganj. The [superintendent] and I rushed to the spot by car…
Although we had no more than 4 or 5 men with us the crowd just…melted away and we
were utterly unable to catch a single one of them. This is typical of what happened
throughout the riot. On the appearance of the police or the military, the rioters fled as fast
as their legs would carry them. One witness M. Marvin Prasad Nigars has cited this
incident as an instance of police inaction where a mob could have been and should have
been dispersed by force.260
Elaborating on his comment, Barron stated, “I am unable to understand his meaning. Mr. Rogers
and I were on the spot. Within two or three minutes and on our arrival the mobs fled. If Marvin
Prasad means we should have fired on the crowd I am unable to agree with him. I know of no
order, which justifies us in on firing on a fleeing crowd.”261 Barron censures Marvin Nigars for
complaining about the lack of an action Barron considers inappropriate. Barron finds his
criticism incomprehensible and the impact of his statement is to suggest that riot observers had
no understanding of what feasible measures could be taken. Sale echoes Barron’s sentiments in
his statement on the “Alleged Lack of Strictness by the Military and the Police.” He maintains,
“neither I nor any of the Magistrates or Police Officers were reluctant to order firing in any case
where it was justified under the rules…I do not think that the critics were fully acquainted with

260
261

Barron Testimony, 1931, 10.
Barron Testimony, 1931, 11.

79
the exact circumstances of the riots or the rules bearing on the subject.”262 From Sale’s
testimony, the riot participants appear ignorant in common law. Their criticisms are irrational
because they put forth unreasonable expectations of what the police and Magistrates could have
done. Barron and Sale’s testimony show that even when riot participants attempted to take a
more active stance in discussing the riots-by criticizing police inaction and suggesting other
steps-they were unable to suggest feasible measures.
Without negating any of their earlier statements regarding Hindu-Muslim strife in India,
the authors of the British Commission Report weaken Barron and Sale’s depiction of riot
observers. While bearing in mind that the “civil disobedience movement accentuated the
estrangement between the two communities,” the authors of the British Commission Report call
into question the professional competence of the District Magistrate to end the riots. They
support claims of police inaction during the course of the violence. Remarking:
Every class of witness before us who gave expression otherwise to widely different
points of view agreed in this one respect, that the police showed indifference and
inactivity in dealing with the various incidents in the riot. These witnesses include
European businessmen, Muslims and Hindus of all shades of opinion, military officers,
the Secretary of the Upper India Chamber of Commerce, representatives of the Indian
Christian community, and even Indian officials,263
they contend, “it is impossible to ignore such unanimity of evidence.”264 They further highlight
the ineffectiveness of pickets and with regard to lathi (club) charges, saying, “we think these
charges might have been pressed home more.”265 Their words substantiate the claims of
witnesses that Barron and Sale both decry. While castigating Barron and Sale, however, the
authors of the British Commission Report do not overturn their assumptions about Indians.
Hindu-Muslim strife still characterizes Hindu-Muslim relations.
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What is apparent in British official documents is the specific way in which they invoke
riot participants. Both private testimonies and the British Commission Report use riot
participants to underscore traits of Indians that had been previously used to justify British rule in
India. Riot participants are called upon to evidence British claims rather than document the
events of the riots. The effect is that riot participants become superfluous to understanding the
events of the Kanpur Riots and instead become important in understanding how British officials
view Indians.
Appropriating the Voices of Rioters
In the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, the anecdotes of riot participants form the bulk
of the narrative of the events of the Kanpur riots. In comparison to the British Commission
Report in which the authors quote only three Indian witnesses, the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report quote sixty-seven different people in their narrative of the riots.266 The
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report name and use the words of more than twentytwo times the number of Indian witnesses that the authors of the British Report employ. The
difference is stark. The dissimilar ways in which the two Reports are written evince the different
ways in which they are intended to be read. While the British Report was meant for higher
British officials, the Kanpur Riot Commission Report was written to educate the public. Their
efforts to do so took the form of using the public’s voice to narrate the violence of the riots. By
presenting the events of the riots in the words of riot participants, the Congress Party became the
intermediaries, acting as the mouthpiece for the public. The public’s words were the Congress
Party’s words and the Congress Party’s words were the words of the people.
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The most obvious way riot participants are used is to provide a context for the events of
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. As the authors of the Report recount the incidents of the
riots, the Kanpur Riots emerge as a series of efforts by Congress Party officials to quell the riots.
Riot participants are invoked to the extent that Congress leaders are not operating within a
vacuum. The narratives of riot participants are used to document the actions of Congress Party
leaders. The beginning pages see Congress Party leaders rushing around the city attempting to
minimize the disturbance caused by the hartal. G.G Jog “successfully dissuades the
Mohammedans from throwing stones… and successfully pacifies Hindu and Muslim crowds.”267
Later that day, Shri Iqbal Kapoor and Vidyarthi are successful in their endeavor to force a Hindu
crowd gathered near Babu Mangli Prasad’s gate to cease “throwing stones at a Musalman
crowd.”268 Congress leaders appeal to the Kotwali In-Charge (superintendent of police) and are
dismayed when he ignores their requests to address the violence and instead, “smiling, turns his
face to the reverse side of the speaker at every appeal.”269 The riot participants are incorporated
in this story only as the population on behalf of whom these actions are taking place. Their
statements throw light upon the actions of Congress Party leaders and depict them collectively as
the public’s saviors.
As the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report document the increasing violence
of the Kanpur Riots, riot participants become hapless victims. Their place in the narrative
reinforces the perception of Congress Party leaders as heroes and their rescue efforts as a
testament to the courage of Congress Party workers. Prefacing their narrative of the events of the
second and remaining days of the riots, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
editorialize how “the terrific outburst on the 24th had altogether stunned responsible sections of
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the residents of Kanpur, and the open and deliberate inaction of the Police still more increased
their feelings of helplessness.”270 The personal anecdotes of riot participants and the involvement
of Congress Party officials showcase the Congress Party as the protector and defender of the
people. Munshi Abdul Haq, owner of the biggest hosiery shop in Kanpur, recounts how the
police did not interfere with the rioters looting his shop and instead, the duty falls to Ganesh
Vidyarthi:
Mr. Ram Karan Sinha, Officer-in-Charge of the Kotwali, with a Deputy Collector, who
was putting on a hat and knickers and twenty to twenty-five head constables and
constables together with eight or ten mounted police were present at the crossing and
were seeing all that was happening at my shop. I told Mr. Ram Kiran Sinha that the
doors and locks of my shop were being broken, and requested him to save my shop. He
replied that he could not do anything. In the meantime, my shops was actually broken
into and, and goods inside began to be looted. I continued to do my utmost to draw the
attention of Mr. Ram Karan Sinha and the Deputy Collector towards, it but each time,
they invariably replied, “We cannot do anything.” After about half an hour or threequarters of an hour, the loot suddenly stopped. On enquiry, I learnt that Ganeshji had
reached my shop and had driven away from there people who were looting it. 271
The intervention of a prominent Congress Party leader, Vidyarthi, saves Haq’s store. Officials
standing by “cannot do anything” while Vidyarthi single-handedly stops the looting. Though it is
Sinha’s job to act and he has enough constables to perform his duty, he does not. Officials
associated with the British Government, “the police officer in charge, the Deputy Collector, the
policemen, and the mounted sowars were all standing and seeing the fun.”272 Haq castigates the
officials for their inaction. His statement exemplifies a trend in the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report: while Congress workers work tirelessly to aid riot victims, officials stand idly by. S.
Bhasin, Advocate Secretary, UP Kerana Seva Samiti relates, “the houses were being looted in
the very presence of the police in Bengali Mohal as well as Butcherkhanna. The constables were
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merely watching….”273 Discussing an incident of looting he had witnessed, Sri Bari Nath
Kapoor declares that:
This was being done before the very eyes of two Deputy Collectors, who were standing
at a distance of about 60 yards from the shops, with the City Kotwal. Although a strong
police force was at their disposal, they did nothing to stop the loot….The constables,
instead of protecting the shop, were eating English sweetmeats and using vegetable oil
which they took from the shop.”274
In all three accounts, riot participants criticize the police for not fulfilling their duty. In the final
case, the officers take part in the crime. This facet of officers engaging in criminal activity
figures heavily in the following set of quotations the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report include.
From being inactive during the riots, the police discredit themselves further when they
collude with rioters. Witness statements in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report document how
constables commit crimes against riot victims. The inclusion of this set of quotations is notable
for two reasons. First, the authors of the Congress Party insert themselves into the situation when
they describe how constables abuse riot victims using Congress Party rhetoric and second, they
use this rhetoric to turn the violence into an act of the British Government against the Civil
Disobedience Movement. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report employ witness
statements to make this point. Pandit Mathura Prasad Bajpei, a “well-known citizen of Kanpur”
recounts how:
The police, in addition to the observance of non-intervention policy, sometimes helped
themselves in filling their pockets and sometimes in taking men seeking their help and
protection to the quarters where the Badmashes were stationed, and asking them to give
that person Swaraj, meaning thereby that they were to be belabored, which they did freely
and to their heart’s content.275
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Swaraj, one of the cornerstones of the Civil Disobedience Movement, literally meaning “selfrule,” functions as a word for abuse. In his statement, Shri Ram Bharose of Baconganj
corroborates Bajpei’s statement. He relates how, “two of the policemen with us, one belonging to
the armed police and the other to the civil police, said to the crowd, ‘these men want Swaraj.’
Some people from the crowd asked the police, it is your order we give them Swaraj? Then the
two policemen said, ‘Yes, give them Swaraj.’ Then some people from the crowd began striking
us with lathis (clubs), ballams (spears), khantas (axes), etc.”276 Two witnesses condemn the
police. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report only function as the medium by
which these witnesses are able to make their statement.
While vilifying officials, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report use witness
statements to contrast their behavior with the actions of the most prominent Congress member in
Kanpur, Ganesh Vidyarthi, President of the United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee.
Revered as the only man who would be able to restore peace, Ganesh Vidyarthi becomes a
model for all Congress Party workers. His efforts to rescue inhabitants of violence stricken
neighborhoods are recorded in great detail and in describing his various endeavors, the authors of
the Kanpur Riot Commission Report call upon an eyewitness to describe “Ganeshji’s Last
Sacrifice.” He writes:
On the 25th March, when Ganeshi reached Patkapur he was bareheaded and
barefooted. There he appealed to both Hindus and Musalmans to live amicably….As
soon as they entered [a house near Bengali Mohal] they saw a head separated from the
trunk, and the dead body of a child which had been pierced together with a spear.
Seeing this Ganeshji wept loudly, and said, “Oh God! Destroy these evil doers.”
Chhotey Khan who heard him crying like this was so much affected by Ganeshji’s
words that he also began to weep. Others began to weep. Ganeshji clung to Chhotey
Khan and both of them wept. 277
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The witness uses emotionally laden terms to describe Vidyarthi’s reaction to the violence. In
contrast to the devil-may-care, criminal behavior of the police, Vidyarthi and his followers
demonstrate real grief toward the victims of riot atrocities. Vidyarthi, through the words of an
eyewitness, emerges as a beloved hero whose reaction to the violence is shared by the people
who accompany him. Their grief affects him and his horror at the violence stirs them.
Juxtaposing testimonies of witnesses who recall Vidyarthi’s commitment to ending the riots with
statements decrying the inaction of the police, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report emphasize the stark differences between the two groups.
Going hand-in-hand with the riot participants’ role in extolling Ganeshji is their role in
demonstrating that Hindu-Muslim relations have not been permanently rancorous. Shri Kanshaya
Lal recounts, “Ganeshji came to my house with these volunteers and five or six others. Ganeshji
insisted that unless I first fed the Musalmans and gave them water to drink with my own utensils,
he [Ganeshji] would not take water at my place. At this I gave the Musalmans with us water in
my own tumbler and then took Ganeshji to the pipe inside.”278 The authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report call upon riot participants to show that the British conception of
longstanding enmity is false. By token of his position, Vidyarthi is able to enjoin Hindus and
Muslims to disregard societal strictures pertaining to religion. The words of witnesses are used to
recount Vidyarthi’s influence and while in this particular incident, he is the main character,
Vidyarthi is not the architect behind every moment of Hindu-Muslim unity. Riot participants,
themselves, broach the issue of sectarian strife and the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report call upon them to overturn assumptions that religious antagonism is built into HinduMuslim relations.
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The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report use riot participants to evidence
ideological claims they set forth in opposition to the British. In a section entitled, “The Silver
Lining,” the authors of the Report include “typical cases” of Hindu-Muslim partnership. These
cases are divided into three categories: first, when influential leaders intervened to stop
communal violence; second, when members of a neighborhood collaborated to protect both
Hindus and Muslims from attacks; and third, when individuals took it upon themselves to rescue
riot victims at risk of personal injury.279 As seen through the words of riot participants, the duty
or motivation to conciliate Hindus and Muslims was not limited to any particular part of the
population. Riot participants, across all strata of society, contribute to efforts to end sectarian
strife. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report relate the account of Abid Husain, a
Muslim resident of Colonelganj who “gave shelter to a number of Hindu families.” They report:
“at great personal risk, he often went out of his house and remonstrated with both Hindus and
Musalmans not to fight. Sometimes he succeeded, and sometimes, he got beaten in reply. On
several occasions, we are told, Hindus and Musalmans, who had come to fight, parted after
embracing each other on account of Abid Husain’s touching appeals (my emphasis).280 Husain
becomes a hero through the course of the riots and his story is conveyed to the authors of the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report, not formulated by the latter. His anecdote is a case example of
riot participants assuming responsibility to end the riots.
The number of individual cases cited in the Congress Report demonstrates the limits of
sectarian violence. The authors “casually quote” the incidents they record, noting that “we mean
no injustice to the larger number of cases known and unknown to us, many of which may be

279
280

Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 382.
Kanpur Riot Commission Report, 392-393.

87
deserving of much greater credit.”281 What is common to many of the accounts is how the
testimonies of other witnesses are used to support the claims. The authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report distance themselves from substantiating claims, instead relying upon riot
participants to do so. Relating an example of the first category, the Congress Party authors write,
“Syed Ahmad Husain, an old man and an owner of many houses in Anwarganj, protected the life
and property of his fifty-five Hindu tenants including men, women and children, and also
provided them with food at his own cost, during the days of the riot. His tenants acknowledge his
generosity” (my emphasis). 282 Similarly, they recount how “Shri Ram Ratan Gupta testifies that
in Sadar Bazar, about 50 Musalman families were bottled up amidst a population of about 25,000
Hindus, and that “not a single Muslman was injured in that area.”He says that the credit for this
is also due to Shri Ratan Singh” (my emphasis).283 Finally, “A Musalman named Mirzapur
Ayub, in Farrashkhana, together with some other Musalman friends of the Mohalla, gave shelter
to and protected the lives of 283 Hindu men, women and children. The list is in possession of
Mirza Ayub and was confirmed by Hindu witnesses present on the spot…”284 (my emphasis) In
all three anecdotes, riot participants present and evidence examples of Hindu-Muslim unity.
Their accounts are self-sufficient in the sense that the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report do not see a need to editorialize their remarks. The anecdotes, as they are presented in the
text, are numbered sequentially and there is no space for editorial comments. After presenting
over twenty-seven anecdotes, however, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
include themselves in their narrative.285
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Describing the atmosphere of the city in the aftermath of the violence, the authors of the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report call upon riot participants to openly disavow two assumptions
justifying British rule. They write:
During our local inspections and enquiries, small crowds of Hindus and Muslims used to
naturally gather around us. While we questioned, their heads would grow hot and
recriminations would begin. Then we used to ask them, do you really hate each other? At
this, they would become silent, hang their heads, and after a while sigh and say, “The
CID have caused the fighting.”286
Both Hindus and Muslims maintain that the British Secret Service is accountable for the
religious violence. Their statement overturns two reasons given for the necessity of British rule
in India. The CID’s purported involvement makes the state morally illegitimate while
additionally undermining the argument that Hindu-Muslim relations have always been
characterized by strife. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report first present the
words of riot participants before surmising that, “their [the people’s] faith in the Government had
been shaken greatly. Their faith in the Congress remained.”287 Their conclusion comes after the
point has already been established by the people’s words. The people have made this discovery
about the Government and the Congress Party authors are conveying their finding.
The final way riot participants are incorporated into the Kanpur Riot Commission Report is
to substantiate claims that are otherwise unverified. Most notably, riot participants discuss the
British Government’s failure to quell the riots and their encouragement of the violence. In a
section entitled, “The Official at Work,” the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
present the testimony of an unnamed witness who recounts how British officials knew of the
riots and did not act. “On the 20th of March at about 8pm, when I went to Chandoo-khana, a
Muslim quarter, a woman from inside came to open the door. She opened the door and at once
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told me not to come there for 4 or 5 days as there was soon going to be a quarrel between Hindus
and Mohemmadans.”288 Her information came from a subordinate official, “B” who purportedly
was setting Hindus and Muslims against each other and had given orders to a non-official who
informed the woman that “whatever happens, we have to carry out what we are asked to” despite
“that the quarrel may increase, many may be killed and we may have to grieve.”289 In addition to
anecdotal evidence, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report present witness
testimonies that blame the British for the long-term causes of the riot. Mausalana Hasrat Mohanj,
a “prominent communal leader,” states, “I do not believe in the Tanzim Programme, because this
movement has been started at the instance of the Government and some of its leading spirits are
connected with the CID.”290 His assertion is supported by the testimony of “a gentleman, who
was one of the early organizers of the Tanzim movement in Kanpur ”291 The unnamed witness
“tells us [the authors of the Report] that “this Tanzim Movement was given money simply with
this object, that the Muslims may not join the Congress.”292 Both witnesses contend the
government has an interest in embittering Hindu-Muslim relations. The two statements call into
question the legitimacy of the state by insinuating the Government had a role in promoting strife.
Together the two assertions allow the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report to write,
“if we could have detailed information as to how the Secret Service Funds of the Government are
spent, much light would be thrown on matters.”293 The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission
Report ask for governmental accountability and they back their request with evidence from two
witnesses.
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The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report move away from using witness
testimonies to questioning the British Government’s involvement in the Tanzim Movement to
ascertaining their culpability. They write, “we questioned one of the prominent witnesses who,
according to the general belief and also according to his own admission, was one of the principal
organizers of the [Tanzeem] movement in Kanpur, whether the Government was helping the
movement financially either directly or through third parties. His reply was, ‘I cannot deny it.’294
What is interesting about the witnesses’ statement is that he simply affirms a positive response to
the question without using any of his own words. From using the words of a witness to confirm
suspicions that the Government helped engineer the Tanzim Movement, the authors of the
Kanpur Riot Commission Report make the same inference about the immediate cause of the
riots. They use the words of Shiakh Ghazi Khizr Muhammad Sahib to claim that the instigators
of the riots were “secret agents of the CID.”295 In his own words, Shiakh Ghazi Muhammad is
“morally sure,” that the Government had a role in the immediate breakout of violence.296 Both
witness statements gradually build up a case against the Government and British officials’
culpability becomes increasingly evident through the words of the witnesses cited. Hoon, another
witness quoted in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, castigates British officials for their
inadequate response to the violence. He declares:
If it is suggested that the communal riots on the 24th took the authorities by surprise, I
would submit that proposition is wholly untenable. That communal tension was on the
rise, that Mohemmadans had inadvertently got themselves mixed up with aggressive
propaganda against the Hindus, that the Mohemmadans had in their possession a large
number of weapons, …..are facts fully known to the Collector and the district authorities
before the riot broke out. …His want [the District Magistrate’s] of preparation to meet
the contingency was simply inexcusable.297
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Deploring the official efforts to quell the riots, Hoon, a European resident of Kanpur, fortifies the
authors’ case against the British authorities. His observation coupled with the two previous
witness statements showcase the British Government in Kanpur as morally illegitimate. The
mounting evidence the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report level against British
officials shows riot participants making these claims and highlights the Congress’ role as an
intermediary between their words and the larger public.
The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report invoke the words of riot participants to
describe the riots. By doing so, they become the mouthpiece for the public. Every claim the
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report make is corroborated by anecdotes and
impressions of riot participants. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report are involved
to the extent that they are formatting how the rioters’ stories reach the public. The question, then,
remains to what extent do the authors of the Report accurately interpret the voices of riot
participants?
Sifting through Words and Voices
What is apparent in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report is that the way the authors
phrased their questions influenced the responses they received from riot observers. The authors
failed to consider, however, that the public’s voice could weaken some of their own political
claims. Some riot participants pointed to sectarian mobilization as a predisposing cause for
conflict and because their testimonies, to some extent, held the Congress Party culpable, they had
their comments qualified by the authors of the Report or omitted completely.
The Kanpur Riot Commission Report was appended by three notes. The first, authored by
Das and Sunderlal, was largely a discourse on majority and minority rights as they related to
Hindus and Muslims. The second, by Sunderlal alone, added a discussion of Christianity and its
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teachings to the history included in the Report, and the third was a note of dissent by Maulana
Zafarul-Mulk. The final note was the most problematic and in a memorandum to Sirdar
Vallbhbhai Patel, President of the All-India Congress Committee, New Delhi, Das wrote:
It is with very great reluctance that I add here a few words of explanation on one point,
regarding procedure, which my esteemed colleague Maulana Zaraful-Mulk has raised in
his Note. He says that certain passages, which he reproduced in his Note “were deleted
after that had once been discussed and passed by the whole Committee, and adds,
“When I received the fair copy of the Report I protested against this extraordinary
procedure and am constrained to say neither satisfactory reasons were given nor the
deleted passages were restored, even on my request.298
Das explains that after Zafarul-Mulk had left Benares, “practically the whole Report was revised
and re-arranged,” noting, however, that he did not anticipate any controversy with the final
version of the Report.299 Zafarul–Mulk’s complaints revolved around the interviews of thirty
Congress members whose statements were later omitted in the final draft of the Report. ZafarulMulk produces excerpts from nine of the witnesses in his Note, all of which decry the
‘communalist’ outlook affecting members of the Congress Party. He cites, “one gentlemen says:
‘men who are absolutely above Hindu-Muslim feeling are a microscopic minority-in the
Congress organization here. Not more than two or three-the rest are all defensive communalists
and not offensive communalists...’ 300 By “defensive communalists,” Zaraful-Mulk refers to
Hindus who believe that Hindus need to be organized in defensive organizations against
Muslims. “Offensive communalists” are those Hindus who actively seek confrontation with
Muslims. A third witness quoted by Zaraful-Mulk stresses this distinction. He testifies:
Out of the thirty prominent Congressmen in the town, there are all grades of people with
regard to communal feeling. I think two or three of these can be said to be absolutely
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above Hindu-Muslim feeling. About ten to fifteen have some slight Hindu tinge in
them…Two or three are aggressive communalists, and the rest ten or twelve are
communalists of defensive character. They do not mean any harm to the other
community, but they do believe in Hindus organizing themselves for defence.301
Witnesses cited by Zaraful-Mulk corroborate each others’ statements. While the figures they cite
do not exactly correlate, there is a general consensus between the witnesses cited that members
of the Congress Party share some sort of defensive communalism. “An eighth says: ‘of thirty
prominent Congressmen in Cawnpore, I believe roughly about 5 per cent are absolutely above
communal feeling. A similar number are aggressive communalists, and the remaining 90 per cent
are of various shades, but are mostly defensive communalists.’302 The witnesses depict Congress
Party members as drastically different than the accepting, religious tolerant heroes of the Kanpur
riots the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report showcase them to be.
Congress Party members blame other members in their organization for contributing to
Hindu-Muslim tensions. Recognizing that the witness testimonies would weaken the credibility
of the Congress, Das justified its exclusion on the grounds that:
Besides the consideration that they were likely to produce a wrong impression, outside
their setting, and without much further explanation, what finally influenced the
members, who remained behind in Benares to revise and arrange the Report as a whole
in the month of September, to drop them, was the consideration that the deposition were
taken in camera, that the witnesses left it to the discretion of the Committee whether the
evidence should not be used or should be used and in what way.303
Das’ statement is forthright. His open disclosure that the jurisdiction of whether to use the
testimonies of riot participants remained with the Committee highlights his recognition of the
potential threat the words of riot participants can cause. While recognizing the significance of the
statements, however, Das dismissed it, saying:
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The question [of whether to include the testimonies] was one of what might be called
technical propriety. They signify only this that many of the Cawnpore Congress workers
were not able to rise to that high level of being superior to all orthodoxy, and of loving all
mankind irrespective of creed, which was attained by Ganesh Vidyarthi...304
Yet, the testimonies cast doubt upon the claims of the Congress Party to be the party of perfect
diversity. That is, the party that represents all Indians regardless of caste or creed. The voices of
riot participants make this point and Das’ efforts to undermine their importance falls short when
the content of Zaraful-Mulk’s note is considered.
Zaraful-Mulk’s note speaks to why sectarian mobilization was dangerous to the Congress
Party. Highlighting discrepancies between the authors’ of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
claims and the statements of its party members, Zaraful-Mulk made the words of these Congress
Party men a liability. By answering the question, “out of the thirty prominent Congressmen in
Cawnpore, how many do you think are absolutely above communal feeling, etc.?” the witnesses
defamed the people to whom the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report attributed the
end of the riots.305 They presented a muddied view of the Kanpur riots where British guilt could
not be assigned easily because of possible Congress culpability. The authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report had pointed to their party members as being free from religious intolerance
yet the effect of these witnesses’ statements was to present a contradiction. The testimonies, in
the older version of the Report, reflected even more negatively on the Congress Party because
they were used to illustrate how the Nationalist Movement had worsened religious relations. In
the older version of the report, the witness statements preceded the later omitted comment, “in
such an atmosphere, and with such men at the helm, was the C.D. Movement started in
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Cawnpore.”306 The implication was clear; the Civil Disobedience Movement bred sectarian strife
according to the Movement’s own followers.
While Zaraful-Mulk’s note openly questioned Congress Party members’ participation in
sectarian activities, witnesses whose statements remained in the final version of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report did not make such strong claims. Rather, their testimonies did not resonate
completely with the authors’ of the Kanpur Riot Commission Reports views. Their accounts are
notable for two reasons. First, the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report mention or
include references to the process of interviewing and second, because two out of the three
upcoming testimonies are qualified by editorial comments. All three testimonies, in varying
degrees, however, point to sectarian strife, and in the final testimony, to the potential culpability
of the Congress Party as contributing to religious tension.
While discussing predisposing causes of the riots, two witnesses described sectarian
strife as a factor. Senior Vice-Chairman Hafiz Muhammad Siddiq noted that the introduction of
separate electorates in the Kanpur Municipality, whereby Hindus and Muslims cast ballots
exclusively for candidates of their faith, was a cause of anxiety. Although recommending a joint
electorate, Siddiq highlighted one concern: “the one thing that I am anxious to be sure through
these reservations or safeguards is that no man who is either of narrow communalistic mentality
or who is a sycophant of the other community should get a chance of being elected.”307 Siddiq’s
comments were innocuous; his statement suggested only that people with a religiously intolerant
bent could be elected and this result would be problematic. Yet the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report chose to qualify his testimony with the remark, “closely questioned he
306
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[Siddiq] said that ultimately the ‘Hukumat’ i.e. the Government was responsible for all these
communal troubles.”308 Though Siddiq’s assertions were inoffensive, that they did not point to
the British Government as playing a role in worsening religious tensions was troublesome for the
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report. They deemed it necessary to draw attention
away from the fact that Siddiq was wary of “men of narrow communalistic mentality” and
instead ensure that he explicitly blamed the British Government. Siddiq’s testimony, however,
revealed his fear of sectarian mobilization despite the authors’ attempt to overshadow this part of
his statement.
In a similar manner, the testimony of Fida Ahmad Khan Sahib Sherwani called attention
to sectarian strife. He stated, “I add significant experiences of mine during the riots which have
not been covered by answers to these questions. My impression is that the riots started on the
basis of strained communal feelings; but soon they developed into hooliganism and goonda
(gangster) rule…”309 Noting that the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report omitted
questions whose answers could have revolved around sectarian mobilization, Sherwani put forth
his view that “strained communal feelings” played a role in the outbreak of violence. What his
comment does is cast light upon a cause of the riot considered by riot participants as important
but not delved into in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report.
While qualifying statements that reference sectarian strife as a cause of the riots, the
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report do include one direct attack upon the Congress
Party by a witness. Noor-i-Illahi’s testimony castigates the Congress Party for their organization
of a hartal. “In his written statement in English,” Noor-i-Illahi recounted:
[On March 24th] I went to the adjoining shop for consultation, and there the news was reconfirmed that the Congress Hindus were bent upon using extreme force today if the
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Muslims are not going to surrender…. All of us agreed to upon the seriousness of the
situation created by the Congress and decided to close down the shops having in view the
safety of our shops and of our lives.310
Although his comment is not followed by any editorial remarks, the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report convey their doubts of the authenticity of Noor-i-Illahi’s claims by
characterizing him “as an example of extreme Muslim sensitiveness.”311 This depiction of Noori-Illahi serves to discount his claims as being biased. What is notable about Noor-i-Illahi’s
comment, however, is his association of the Congress Party with Hindus and their alliance
against Muslims. Noor-i-Illahi directly addresses the issue of sectarian mobilization and his
comments reveal, along with the other two testimonies recounted, two conclusions. First, the
authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report strove to minimize the importance of sectarian
mobilization as a cause of the riot, and second, that it was a widely shared sentiment unable to be
articulated through the responses demanded by the authors.
What was omitted and editorialized in the Kanpur Riot Commission Report revealed what
riot participants thought. The voices of riot participants, which the authors of the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report strove to cast as part of their own platform, pointed to sectarian mobilization
as an important cause of the riots and one in which the participation of the Congress Party was
muddy. While the authors of the Report dealt with these incriminations by either completely
excluding the evidence or attacking the proponent of the claim, they could not nullify their
damaging effect. Although the comments, for the most part, did not directly refute the
conclusions of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, they did call into question the ability of the
Congress Party to be unequivocally viewed as the heroes of the Kanpur riots. That, in itself, was
a conclusion the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report would not recognize.
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Conclusion
The respective authors of the British Commission Report and the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report intersected in their usage of riot participants. Both deemed riot participants a
necessary component of their retelling of the Kanpur Riots. By invoking them in the text, each
set of authors hoped to promote their respective ideological aims to the detriment of the other.
For their part, the British laid out certain assumptions they held that they believed governed
Hindu-Muslim relations in colonial India. The authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
used the voices of riot participants to refute these assumptions and in doing so, strove to show
how the people, and not the authors of the Report, were making the argument. While the riot
participants did overturn the assumptions, they also impugned the Congress Party to a certain
extent. The Congress Party, as depicted through the words of witnesses cited in the “Note of
Dissent,” was not wholly free from religious antagonism. Witnesses whose testimonies were
included in the Report supported these allegations, pointing to sectarian mobilization as a
contributing cause of the Kanpur Riots. Together, these two sets of witness statements called into
question the portrayal of Congress Party members during the Kanpur Riots.
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CONCLUSION

The paradox between the Kanpur Riots and the Congress Report has two sides: the
significance of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report and the apparent insignificance of the
Kanpur Riots. What I have argued is that because the riot participants were the subject and
audience for the Kanpur Riot Commission Report, understanding the Kanpur Riots is central to
understanding the Congress Report. The Report’s creation in 1931 came at a time when a
number of religious riots were affecting India. The authors sought to explain the violence in
terms that did not call upon colonial formulations about Indians but rather extended the blame to
the colonial state. To that end, they crafted a framework explaining Hindu-Muslim relations in
terms that overturned British justifications for imperial rule. Their intent to “expose the methods
by which our [Indian] history has been deliberately misinterpreted and misrepresented” evolved
into the creation of a framework that would be invoked in nationalist histories from the time the
report was published in the 1930s until as recently as 2006.312
Because the Report has become increasingly famous-evidenced by the number of
secondary sources that call upon its findings- I chose to resolve the paradox by focusing on riot
observers. Chapter Two and Three brought the Kanpur Riots to the forefront of the controversy
surrounding the Report. I have argued that the Kanpur Riots were important to an understanding
of the Report because they allowed the authors to evidence and put forth their claims in the
words of riot participants. The voices of ordinary citizens of Kanpur, unaffiliated with either the
Congress Party or the British Government, provided an in-depth look at an instance of Hindu-
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Muslim strife from the perspective of those involved. While fascinating in themselves, two facets
of witness testimonies were particularly striking. First, some citizens disagreed with the claims
of the Congress Party and second, their testimonies were qualified with editorial remarks that
attempted to minimize the impact of the witness’ statement. The witnesses cited in the Report
pointed to sectarian mobilization as a cause for strife while the Congress Party members quoted
in Maulana Zaraful-Mulk’s “Note of Dissent” openly contested the depiction of Congress
workers presented in the text of the Report. While not wholly refuting the claims of the Kanpur
Riot Commission Report, they did mar the reputation of the Congress Party. Riot participants’
voices revealed an inconsistency between the claims made by the authors of the Report and the
actions of Congress Party members during the riots.
One final note needs to be added. My thesis revolved around the Kanpur Riot
Commission Report; specifically, the way the authors of the Report used the words of riot
participants. What is important to note is that the Report allows for the type of criticisms I have
charged it with precisely because they included the voices of the riot observers. Crafting an
equitable narrative is an impossible task and the authors of the Kanpur Riot Commission Report
did attempt to represent the people, a task the colonial state did not bother to undertake in their
analysis of the Kanpur Riots. The fact that the authors of the Report did assume this monumental
task is as enriching today as it was in 1931. It showed how nationalists viewed their past and the
Congress Party’s role in the mid-twentieth century. Their contribution to nationalist
historiography was monumental and their writings about riot participants give way to more
varied perceptions of the Congress Party. The Kanpur Riot Commission Report illuminates the
state of Hindu-Muslim relations as the authors viewed it in 1931 and today, can be viewed as a
lens for understanding how a central framework of nationalist historiography was formulated.

101

APPENDIX I: IMAGES OF THE KANPUR RIOTS

102

Photographs from The Leader, April 11, 1931
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Photographs from The Leader, April 19, 1931
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APPENDIX II: MAPS

Figure 1: Location of Kanpur, India

Source: http://wwp.greenwichmeantime.com/time-zone/asia/india/kanpur/map.htm
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Figure 2: Map of Cawnpore District, 1893

Source: Constable's 1893 Hand Atlas to India: A new series of sixty maps and plans prepared from ordinances and
other surveys. Westminister, Constable, 1893.
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